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RECENT CASES
Attorneys-Interstate Legal Services and the
Unauthorized Practice of Law
Plaintiff, a New York attorney, rendered legal services to the defendants, New Jersey residents, in negotiating extensions of credit
and the compromise of claims' held by New York and New Jersey
creditors. 2 In consideration for these services, plaintiff received
promissory notes secured by mortgages which this action was brought
to foreclose, the plaintiff alleging default in payment. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery
Division, granted the defendants' motion for dismissal3 on the ground
that the legal services rendered in negotiating with the New Jersey
creditors constituted the illegal practice of law in that state, and, since
the New Jersey and New York transactions were interrelated, the
illegality of the New Jersey facet rendered the whole contract void. 4
On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, held, reversed. The
public interest demands that an attorney admitted to practice in only
one state should be permitted to render legal services in another in a
matter involving interrelated transactions in both states provided the
transactions in the state where the attorney is not admitted to
practice are substantial and the employment of counsel in both states
would be inefficient or impractical. Appell v. Reiner, 204 A.2d 146

(N.J. 1964).
Although our integrated national economy increasingly presents
legal problems requiring the performance of legal services which constitute the practice of law in more than one state, an attorney seeking
1. The indebtedness was partially that of the defendants, husband and wife, and
partially that of Reintex, Inc., a New Jersey corporation. However, the defendants
were apparently personally liable for the corporate debts as the corporation was "to
all intents and purposes the alter ego of [the defendant husband]," and "the various
individual and collective debts and obligations of defendants and Reintex, Inc. were
so interwined as to constitute an inseparable unit.
Appell v. Reiner, 204 A.2d
146-47 (N.J. 1964).
2. The indebtedness to one New York creditor constituted more than 50% of the
total obligations. The balance of the creditors were located in New Jersey. ibid.
3. 81 N.J. Super. 229, 195 A.2d 310 (1963).
4. "Since the contract between plaintiff and defendants is entire and not severable,
it follows that when part of it is illegal and in violation of the statute the entire
contract is illegal, void and unenforceable. . . . I am satisfied that the agreement
upon which plaintiff bases his claim is illegal and contrary to the public policy of
this State." Id. at 241, 195 A.2d at 317.
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to render such services finds in each of the states differing regulations
with which he must first comply 5 This situation arises primarily
because the practice of law in each state is controlled and regulated
by means of state statutes and rules of court.6 This local regulation
has been held proper even though the legal services rendered within
the state related exclusively to matters in interstate commerce. 7 The
scope of the state's regulatory power, however, does not affect any
right to practice accorded by federal law, such as a license to practice
before a federal agency, 8 even though that right may be exercised
within the geographical boundaries of the state and be questioned in
an action brought in a state court to enforce the right to payment for
services rendered. 9 This responsibility for the competence and fitness
of persons admitted to its bar which is vested in the state has resulted
in the variety of local requirements which the non-resident attorney
must satisfy before rendering legal services which constitute the
practice of law in that particular state. 10 By comity an attorney is
usually given the right to try a particular case in a foreign jurisdiction." An attorney admitted to practice in one state has no right
to be admitted on motion as an attorney in other states; however, the
courts of most jurisdictions have followed the practice of admitting
5. 7 C.J.S. Attorney And Client § 15 (1937). The attorney's status in a state to
whose bar he has not been admitted is generally described in terms such as the
following: "The prohibition [from practicing law without having satisfied the applicable
statutory requisites] applies to every person who has not been admitted to our courts
in accordance with the provisions of our statute. It in effect divides persons into two
classes: First, those who have been so admitted; and second, those who have not.
The language of the prohibition is broad enough to include all not embraced in the
first class." Browne v. Phelps, 211 Mass. 376, 380, 97 N.E. 762, 763 (1912). See
also Emery v. Hovey, 84 N.H. 499, 153 At. 322 (1931); Harriman v. Strahan, 47
Wyo. 208, 33 P.2d 1067 (1912); Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1087 (1919).
6. 7 C.J.S. Attorney And Client § 14 (1937).
7. "It will be presumed . . . that the contracts sued upon involved interstate commerce, and that such commerce is protected by the Federal Constitution from interference by the states. Granting that to be so, such protection does not include the
right to dictate who shall prosecute or defend such contracts as an attorney ....
In re Morse, 98 Vt. 85, 92, 126 Atl. 550, 552 (1924). See also In re Lockwood, 154
U.S. 116 (1894).
8. In Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963), the Supreme Court held a patent
practitioner not subject to state regulations and observed: "[S]ince patent practitioners
are authorized to practice only before the Patent Office, the state maintains control
over the practice of law within its borders, except to the limited extent necessary for
the accomplishment of the federal objectives." Id. at 402.
9. De Pass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144 S.W.2d 146 (1940).
10. See note 5 supra. In Harriman v. Strahan, supra note 5, the court gave the
following as the reason for these local requirements: "[E]ven if we could properly
draw a dividing line between those who have been admitted to practice somewhere
and those who have not, it would still be inadvisable and contrary to the public
interests to have in a state a body of men engaged in the practice of law, who are
not amenable to the same disciplinary measures as men who have been regularly
admitted." Id. at 213, 33 P.2d at 1069.
11. 7 C.J.S. Attorney And Client § 15 (1937).
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attorneys, without examination, on the production of a certificate of
admission by the highest court of another jurisdiction and proof of
practice therein for a prescribed time. 2 A few jurisdictions impose
the more restrictive requirement of requiring the non-resident attorney, although admitted to his local bar, to associate himself with a

resident attorney for the trial of cases or file a written appointment
of a resident attorney on whom service may be had.13 Rules of the

Kansas Supreme Court imposing this requirement were upheld by
the Supreme Court as "not beyond the allowable range of state action

under the Fourteenth Amendment." 14 A person who engages in the
practice of law in a state without first having been admitted as an
attorney therein is engaged in the unauthorized or illegal practice of

law and is subject to a variety of legal sanctions. 15 At one time the
state's power to regulate the practice of law within its boundaries
was held to be subject to virtually no federal constitutional limitations. 16 However, this position has given way in more recent years to
that of requiring that the qualifications exacted of those desiring to
practice law in a state "have a rational connection with the applicant's
fitness or capacity to practice law" in order to bring them within the
reasonable discretion allowed the state under the due process and

equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.'
In two
recent decisions, 8 the Supreme Court has stressed the idea that the
public interest should be the primary criterion applied in determining
what constitutes the unlawful practice of law.' 9
12. ibid.
13. Anderson v. Collin, 27 Idaho 334, 149 P.2d 286 (1915); Felton v. Rubbow, 163
Kan. 82, 179 P.2d 935 (1947); In re Greenberg, 15 N.J. 132, 104 Ad. 46 (1886);
Application of New York County Lawyers' Assn., 207 Misc. 698, 139 N.Y.S.2d 714
(1955); In re Byrne, 17 Pa. Dist. 427 (1908).
14. The Rules of Court of the Supreme Court of Kansas were upheld as constitutional
even as applied to an attorney, who, through a resident of Missouri, had been admitted
to the Kansas bar, and maintained an office in Kansas. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S.
25 (1961). The opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court contains an extensive discussion
of the reasons on which the challenged rules were founded. Martin v. Walton, 187
Kan. 473, 482-83, 357 P.2d 782, 783-84 (1960).
15. A complete summary and discussion of the various sanctions imposed for the
unauthorized practice of law is to be found in I-hicxs & KATz, UNAXTcrHoizD PliACrCE
or LAw 118-21 (1934).
16. In In re Lockwood, supra note 7, the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia rule
excluding women from the practice of law within the state and employed the following language in support of its decision: "[T]he right to control and regulate the
granting of license to practice law in the courts of a State is one of those powers
that was not transferred for its protection to the Federal government, and its exercise
is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of the United States in the
party seeking such license." Id. at 117-18.
17. Schwere v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957); Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
18. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1963); N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
19. For example, in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, supra note 18,
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey, by its decision in Appell v.
Reiner,2 0 emphasized the idea that the public interest should control
the applicability of a state's rules governing the practice of law

within its boundaries, and created an exception to a well-established
New Jersey rule by holding that a non-resident attorney may, under
certain circumstances, render legal services constituting the practice of

law in New Jersey without first meeting that state's requirements for

admission to its bar.2 1 The court first concluded that the legal services

rendered by the plaintiff constituted the practice of law in both New

York and New Jersey.22 This decision that New Jersey practice was

involved would normally have compelled the conclusion that these
services could have been legally performed only by New Jersey

counsel.23 The facts of this case, however, were regarded as presenting one of the "unusual situations in which strict adherence to such

a thesis is not in the public interest."24 Three factors were emphasized
by the court as maldng this departure from the prevailing rule in the

public interest. First, the services to be performed did not involve
any participation by the plaintiff in a court proceeding25 Presumably,

were a court proceeding involved, the need for local counsel fully
familiar with local practice and procedure would be accentuated.

Second, the New Jersey transactions and the New York transactions
involved in the matter were regarded as so closely interrelated as to
render separate handling "grossly impractical and inefficient."26 Third,
the retention of a second counsel would in all probability have greatly
increased the financial burden on the client.2 7 The dissenting opinion
regarded the matter in which the services were rendered as "primarily
a New Jersey one" and the New York facet as "simply an incidental
the Supreme Court held: "In the present case the state again has failed to show any
appreciable public interest in preventing the Brotherhood from carrying out its plan
to recommend the lawyers it selects to represent injured workers." Id. at 8.
20. Supra note 1.
21. "We nevertheless recognize that there are unusual situations in which a strict
adherence [to the prevailing rule] ...is not in the public interest.. . .This is such
a situation." Id. at 148.
22. Id. at 147. The court's decision on this issue distinguished the instant case fron
the situation in which the legal services rendered in the local jurisdiction are so minor
or incidental to a total problem in the foreign jurisdiction that, by comity, they may
be performed by the non-resident attorney. See, e.g., Brooks v. Volunteer Harbor No.
4, 233 Mass. 168, 123 N.E. 511 (1919); Harriman v. Strahan, supra note 5, at 213,
33 P.2d at 1069. This principle was advanced by the dissenters in the instant case.
Supra note 1, at 149.
23. Id. at 148.
24. ibid.
2,5. Ibid.
26. Ibid. "It is self-evident that many difficulties and conflicts would have been encountered in the solution of the tangled and interwoven elements of defendants' financial
dilemma had the New Jersey facets been under the control of New Jersey counsel and
the New York problems under the supervision of New York counsel." Ibid.
27. "This additional financial burden is, if possible, to be avoided." Ibid.

1556

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. is

part of the over-all problem,"2 8 and held that all the legal services
29
ought to have been performed by a New Jersey attorney.
The decision in the instant case proposes one answer to a problem
that in all probability will frequently recur as the bar, which is organized and regulated on an intrastate basis, is called upon to handle

the growing number of interrelated interstate matters which our
national economy is likely to produce. It is significant that in the

northeastern manufacturing and financial centers where such matters
are most likely to arise, the individual state barriers to interstate
practice are most substantial. 30 In evaluating any proposed solution to
the problem of handling integrated interstate matters requiring legal
services which constitute the practice of law in more than one state,
two countervailing interests appear to be of primary concern. First,
the state is charged with the responsibility for setting standards for

admissions to the practice of law that assure the competence and
fitness of persons practicing law within its boundaries and before its
courts. 31 It has been suggested that were an attorney, by virtue of
his admission to the bar of one state, permitted to practice in other
states, he would be practicing law in an atmosphere essentially unregulated and uncontrolled. 32 Second, the legal profession has a re-

sponsibility to the public to handle legal problems adequately and

at a reasonable cost. 33 The New Jersey Supreme Court appears to

have balanced these considerations wisely and, accordingly, has
28. Id. at 148-49.

29. Ibid.
30. Three of the five states requiring the non-resident attorney, though admitted to
the local bar, to associate local counsel for the trial of cases are located in this area
of the country. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 6-10 supra.
32. The lower court observed in support of its holding that the services rendered
by the plaintiff in New Jersey constituted the illegal practice of law as follows: "If attorneys from foreign jurisdictions were able to practice law in New Jersey, they would,
in effect be holding themselves out as attorneys with the privileges attendant thereto,
although they would not be subject to the control of our Supreme Court and our ethics
and grievance committees. Thus, they would be permitted to practice law in an uncontrolled atmosphere. Hence, in attempting to define the outer limits of what constitutes the practice of law in New Jersey, the definition adopted should be one
sufficiently broad to permit the vigorous enforcement of the strong policy of judicial
control over members of the bar for the protection of the public interest." Appell v.
Reiner, 81 N.J. Super. 229, 237-38, 195 A.2d 311, 315 (1963). See also Harriman v.
Strahan, supra note 5. The attorney so practicing would not be without some control.
He would still be liable to the client for negligence in rendering the services in the
foreign jurisdiction. Degen v. Steinbrink, 202 App. Div. 477, 195 N.Y.S. 810 (1922).
Also, there are cases in which an attorney has been reprimanded by his state bar
for unethical and unprofessional conduct in a foreign jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Kent,
39 N.J. 114, 187 A.2d 718 (1963).
33. "The development of modem civilization calls, of necessity, for specialization.
Yet, with specialization it is essential that those who enter a profession, military or
civilian, must eternally keep before their eyes the practical relationship of their own

1965 1

RECENT CASES

1557

reached the proper decision in the instant case. In applying the New
Jersey rules governing the practice of law to the problem of interstate
legal services, the court places the emphasis on the public interest
which the recent Supreme Court decisions seem to require. 34 However, it is submitted that the decision by itself fails to provide a
satisfactory guide to the attorney who is performing or considering
the performance of legal services in connection with an interstate
matter. It would confront such an attorney with the resolution of the
following difficult issues:
1. Whether the matter will require or is likely to require participation in a court proceeding.
2. Whether the various transactions or facets of the total problem
are sufficiently "inseparable" to make their handling by members of different bars "grossly inefficient and impractical."
3. Whether the transactions in the state to whose bar the attorney
is admitted are "substantiar' or merely minor and incidental
to a problem basically founded in another jurisdiction.
To reach even an abstract decision based upon such general standards
would be difficult, and it must be remembered that the actual decision
is made in the context of substantial sanctions for engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law.35 However, the general standards and
philosophy proposed by the court in the instant case-that local barriers to the interstate practice of law must be evaluated in the
context of the public interest in receiving such services-are capable
of refinement as they are applied to a greater variety of factual
contexts.
profession to the rights, the hopes and the needs of the whole body of citizens who
make up the nation." President Roosevelt, Address to the United States Military
Academy, New York Times, June 13, 1935, p. 15, col. 5, quoted in, CEATmAM,
LEGAL PROFEssioN 464 (2d ed. 1955).
34. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
35. See note 15 supra.
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Conflict of Laws-New York Public Policy Permits
Enforcement of Foreign Gambling Obligation
Defendant, a resident of New York, took 6,000 dollars in cash with
him to Puerto Rico to risk in a gambling casino there. After he had
lost this amount, the plaintiff casino lent him an additional 12,000 dollars, evidenced by a check and thirteen "I.O.U.'s," which he also lost.
The loans were valid and enforceable in Puerto Rico where the
plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, had a gambling license. When the
defendant refused to repay the loans the casino sued him in New
York. The trial court, sitting without a jury, gave judgment for the
plaintiff,' but the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the
public policy of New York will not permit a suit in its courts on a
gambling obligation which arose in a professional gambling house,
even though the obligation is legal and enforceable where the debt
arose.2 On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, held, reversed.
The New York public policy against gambling is not strong enough
to forbid enforcement in New York of gambling obligations entered
into in another jurisdiction and legally enforceable there. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527
(1964).
Under the general rules of conflict of laws a contract valid by the
law applicable in the contracting state will be enforced in the courts
of another state or country without regard to whether it would have
been valid by the law of the forum.3 There is an exception to this
general rule when the enforcement of a contract, valid and enforceable
under foreign law would seriously contravene the sound public policy
of the forum, or would unduly prejudice the rights of its citizens.4
Wagering and gambling contracts are condemned in most states,5
and in the states in which they are prohibited, the question has
frequently arisen whether enforcement of a foreign gambling contract,
valid by the law governing it at its inception, should be denied on the
ground that its enforcement would violate the strong public policy of
the forum.6 Gambling was neither illegal nor considered immoral at
common law.7 In England the Gambling Act of 17108 made all bills
1. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 36 Misc. 2d 786, 233 N.Y.S.2d 96
(Sup. Ct. 1962).
2. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 18 App. Div. 2d 45, 238 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1963).
3. Em,,ZWxmc, CoNFmrc OF LAWS § 181 (1962).
4.GooDRIcH, CONFuLICT OF LAWs 198 (4th ed. 1964).
5. LEFi-, CoNmcT OF LAWS § 48 (1959).
6. Gambling cases in the conflicts law are collected in Annot., 173 A.L.R. 695 (1948);
Annot., 64 L.R.A. 160 (1904).
7.EHmNzwm, op. cit. supra note 3, § 181.
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or notes void where any part of the consideration therefor was money
won or loaned in a gambling transaction, but the English cases
involving gambling transactions in a foreign country where gambling
was legal have drawn a distinction between recovery on a check and
recovery for money won or loaned. Recovery has been denied on a
check drawn in France on an English bank as a part of a gambling
transaction on the ground that the making of the check was an
English transaction to be governed by English law, and therefore
void under the Gaming Act.9 The English courts, however, have
allowed recovery on separate counts for money loaned for the
purpose of gambling."' This distinction has not been followed by
the courts of this country." Most of the American cases denying
recovery have rested on the repugnance of gambling obligations to
the strong public policy of the forum.'2
The initial difficulty in this type of case is that public policy is such
a general term that one can gather from it almost anything he pleases.
Therefore, to determine whether a transaction is repugnant to the
public policy of the forum, it is necessary to determine what that
public policy is. 13 The Supreme Court, speaking of public policy in
its local sense, has said that the public policy of a state is to be
found in its statutes, and when they have not directly spoken, then in
the decisions of the courts. 14 In the conflict of laws, however, public
policy has a narrower meaning. Mr. Justice Cardozo, in an often
quoted opinion, said that if the otherwise appropriate foreign law is
to be refused enforcement on public policy grounds, it must "violate
some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal." 15 In
8. 1710, 9 Anne c. 14.
9. Robinson v. Bland, 1 W. Bl. 234, 96 Eng. Rep. 129 (1760), criticized in Cohen,
On the Law of Securities Given Abroad for Gaming Debts, 28 L.Q. REv. 127 (1912);
accord, Moulis v. Owen, [1907] 1 K-B. 746, criticized in Cohen supra and Dicey, Note,
23 L.Q. REv. 249 (1907).
10. Robinson v. Bland, supra note 9; accord, Soxby v. Fulton, [1909] 2 K.B. 208;
Societe Anonyme Des Grands Establissments De Touquet Paris-Plage v. Baumgart,
96 L.J.K.B. (n.s.) 789 (1927).
11. However, one case followed part of the English viewpoint in holding New
York law applicable to a check drawn in Florida on a New York bank in payment of
a gambling debt. Thuna v. Wolf, 132 Misc. 56, 228 N.Y. Supp. 658 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
This case favorably cites Moulis v. Owen, supra note 9.
12. See 15 U. MLAn. L. RE:v. 327-28 (1961); See note 6 supra.
13. See Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies, 25 VA. L. R-v. 26, 31 (1939);
Lawson, Enforcement of Contract Valid Where Made, But Contrary to the Public
Policy of the State of the Forum, 54 GENT. L.J. 223 (1902).
14. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). In speaking
of public policy in its local law sense it is not improper to give it a narrow and
specialized meaning since it concerns local internal affairs. Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y.
466, 474, 3 N.E.2d 597, 600 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
15. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918). This
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contrast to this restrictive view, the Connecticut Supreme Court,
though recognizing the modem trend toward enforcement of gambling contracts when made in another state where gambling is legal,
refused to enforce a gambling contract lawfully entered into in Rhode
Island. 16 A further question which must be considered is whether a

state's refusal to entertain a cause of action recognized by another
state, territory or possession violates the national conflict of laws rule

expressed in the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution and
implementing statutory provisions. 17 There are two competing policies,
that of federal unity and harmony and that of local public policy.18
In Hughes v. Fetter, 9 the Supreme Court refused to allow the alleged
public policy of Wisconsin to defeat a wrongful death action based on
an Illinois statute. The "strong unifying principle embodied in the

Full Faith and Credit Clause looking toward the maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations or rights created or recognized
by the statutes of sister states" 20 required the Wisconsin public policy
to give way. The Court made the further statement "that full
faith and credit does not automatically compel a forum state to
is probably the best test to be found. There is such a variety of circumstances where
the public policy problem arises that generalities are inescapable. The Restatement
takes the view that no action can be maintained on a contract valid by the lex loci
contractus when it is "contrary to the strong public policy of the forum." RESTATrM r (SEcoND), CoNri.cr OF LAws § 612 (1958).
16. Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn. 51, 54 A.2d 669 (1947). This contract
involved betting on horse races. The court found betting on horse races is a criminal
offence in Connecticut, and contracts to do so are void. These rules are police
regulations designed to advance the public and governmental interests in the morality
of the citizenery. This, the court held, was a strong enough public policy to deny
enforcement.
17. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records,
and Proceedings shall be proved and the Effect thereof."
Congress has implemented this section of the Constitution by providing that "the
Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States . . .
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territorities and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the Courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
In a case such as the instant case of Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15
N.Y.2d 9, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964), there would be a further problem of whether
Puerto Rico which is technically neither a state, territory or possession would fall
within the coverage of the full faith and credit clause. There are no cases on this
point but it seems clear that the Constitution and the Code would apply to statutes
of Puerto Rico. See Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, aff'd, 206 F.2d 377 (1953);
Stem, Notes on the Historj of Puerto Rico's Commonwealth Status, 30 Riv. Jun.
U.P.R. 33 (1961); Summer, The Status of Public Acts in Sister States, 3 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1 (1956).
18. Paulsen & Severn, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. R~v.
969, 1012-15 (1956).
19. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
20. Id. at 612.
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subordinate its own statutory policy to a conflicting act of another
state; rather, it is for this Court to choose in each case between the
competing public policies involved."21 No cases have been found
where the Court has upheld the refusal to apply a sister state's public
act on the ground of public policy where the full faith and credit
issue was properly raised and where there was legislative jurisdiction
in the sister state. 22 However, the Court has reversed several cases in
which full faith and credit was denied because of public policy
reasons. 23 Moreover, the Court has clearly indicated that the applicability of the public policy exception is restricted under the full faith
2
and credit clause. 24 The cases of First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines 5
and Hughes v. Fetter26 show that the Court will closely supervise the
use of the public policy doctrine. This close supervision is necessary
because without it the constitutional duty under the full faith and
credit clause could be evaded.
In the instant case, the court said that to deny enforcement of this
claim there would have to be a "clear showing" that its enforcement
would "offend our sense of justice or menace the public welfare."27
An examination of past New York cases discloses that "even in
Victorian times," New York had no "strong public policy" against
enforcement of gambling contracts valid by the law governing it at its
inception.28 To determine the public policy of the forum the court
looked not only to the statutes and the Constitution, but also to the
"prevailing social and moral attitudes of the community" and concluded that a "licensed gambling transaction" is "morally acceptable."21 The Puerto Rican law which allows the enforcement of
gambling transactions leaves it within the discretion of the court to
reduce or even to decline to enforce gambling transactions if the
losses are "in an amount which may exceed the customs of a good
family man."30 The majority reasoned that to refuse enforcement of
this valid Puerto Rican transaction might make New York a sanctuary
for those seeking to avoid their legal obligations. 31 The court further
pointed out that the refusal of the courts of other states to enforce
21. Id. at 611.
22. Sumner, supra note 17, at 24.
23. Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 18, at 1013-14.
24. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673-74 (1896). See also Loucks v. Standard
Oil Co., supra note 15.
25. 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
26. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
27. Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, supra note 17, at 529, quoting Louchs
v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 15, at 110, 120 N.E. at 201.
28. Id. at 530.
29. Id. at 531.
30. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 4777 (1955).
31. See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 198.
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Nevada gambling debts is irrelevant since the Nevada courts refuse
to enforce gambling debts made there even though gambling is legal. 32
The dissenting opinion argued that the enforcement of this Puerto
Rican obligation violates not one but two well defined public policies
of New York: First, that the operation of a gambling house "was an
indictable public nuisance at common law and . . . professional
gamblers are outlaws in New York;"n and, second, that the state
courts have from earliest times refused to enforce gambling transactions.3 4 The fact that New York has amended its constitution to
allow bingo games and pari-mutuel betting3 5 does not indicate a
change of public policy, the dissent argued, because there are
"important differences between those
two forms of gambling and
6
the operation of gambling houses."
In a conflict of laws case the plaintiff seeks only to give legal effect
to acts done elsewhere and in accordance with the law there prevailing. There is much to be said for enforcing obligations deliberately
and legally entered into because people normally intend to be
bound by their agreements,3 7 and it would seem that the law should
encourage enforcement of these moral obligations. It is, however, well
known that people desire to take chances and will often gamble away
their life's earnings in an attempt to turn chance into fortune.38
While recognizing the danger of underworld control of gambling,
with all the ramifications affecting numerous and legitimate business
enterprises, 39 courts often overlook the deep-rooted and built-in compulsions which encourage Americans to gamble and which comprise
a continuing market upon which the gambling racketeer depends.40
32. 15 N.Y.2d at 16, 254, N.Y.S.2d at 532. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Abadjian, 30
Cal. 2d 49, 179 P.2d 804 (1947) (refusal by a California court to enforce a Nevada
gambling contract as a mere application of Nevada law); West Indies v. First Nat'l
Bank, 67 Nev. 13, 214 P.2d 144 (1950).
33. 15 N.Y.2d at 18-19, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 534.
34. Ibid.
35. N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 9.
36. 15 N.Y.2d at 18-19, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 534. The dissenters do not explain these
widely recognized differences, but merely conclude that the fact that in 24 states
pari-mutuel betting is legal and in 11 states bingo is legalized is sufficient evidence
of the differences.
37. See GooDrIcH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 200. A basic underlying policy, common
to all nations, is that the law should attempt to let the parties do as they intended,
so long as they do not injure third parties.
38. For a short discussion of the pernicious consequences of gambling and its demoralizing effect upon the individual involved and the society, see Gooch v. Faucett,
122 N.C. 270, 29 S.E. 362 (1898).
39. See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on the AttorneyGeneral's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1653 (1961); Yowmy, THE ENEMY WrrmN,263-65 (1960); Siberling, The Federal
Attack on Organized Crime, 8 Canmm AiN DEInsm. 365 (1962).
40. Block, The Gambling Business: An American Paradox, 8 CRam Am Dmm. 355,
358 (1962).
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Where to draw the line between governmentally sanctioned forms of
gambling and illegal forms is a difficult and subtle problem, and
often the basis for determining it is without sufficient rational support.
The Puerto Rican law allows many forms of gambling, but all are
subject to governmental regulation and control. As a further protection for the gambler the Puerto Rican law leaves within the discretion
of the court the extent to which a gambling obligation shall be
enforced. 41 Thus, when a foreign court is asked to enforce a Puerto
Rican gambling contract it can refuse to do so if it feels that the
individual's loss has been too great. The decision in the instant case
recognizes that even though a gambling contract made in New York
would not be enforced by the New York courts, it does not necessarily
follow that a legally enforceable foreign contract is against the strong
public policy of New York. Public policy should not be determined
by mere reference to the laws of the forum alone. It is found in the
prevailing social and moral attitudes of the community which are
reflected not only by the decisions of the courts, but also by such
actions as the legalization of pari-mutuel betting and bingo games
and, in some areas, organized movements for legalized off-track
betting. Newspapers print odds on horse races, boxing matches,
football games, the world series as well as the names of the winners
of the Irish Sweepstakes. The courts should look to all of these
factors in determining the public policy of the forum. It is true that
this method will be more difficult and time consuming than looking
only to statutes and court decisions, but it will result in more
equitable decisions. Certainly, the public policy doctrine serves a
useful purpose in our society, but it should be used with caution and
a foreign obligation should be enforced unless it "violates the strongest
moral convictions or appears profoundly unjust."42 Today it would
seem that there are few causes of action legally enforceable in one
state, territory or possession that would be so far outside the social,
economic and moral standards of another state as to be violative of
its strong public policy.
41. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
42. Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 18, at 1012. See also LEi'LAn, op. cit. supra note
5, § 48.
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Conscientious Objectors-Universal Military Training
and Service Act-Supreme Court Test of
"Belief In A Relation to A Supreme Being"
Three men who claimed exemption from military service as conscientious objectors under section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act' had their claims denied because the religious
beliefs upon which they were based did not include a "belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being" as required by this section. Convictions
followed for refusal to submit to draft induction. These men were
not members of an organized religious sect, followed no ritual, knew
no catechism, acknowledged no scripture, did not worship in a church
or temple, and followed no priests. Their religious beliefs were not
based upon an orthodox conception of a Supreme Being; the objections to military service were grounded solely upon their sincere and
meaningful internally derived beliefs in opposition to war.2 On appeal,
1. 62 Stat. 613 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958): "(j)
Nothing contained in this title . . . shall be construed to require any person to be
subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States
who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological,
or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. . . . (Emphasis added.)
2. Daniel Andrew Seeger submitted U.S. Selective Service Form No. 150, Special
Form for Conscientious Objector (Revised Feb. 9, 1959). He altered Series I-Claim
for Exemption, in the following manner: "(B) I am, by reason of my 'religious' belief,
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form and I am further conscientiously opposed to participation in noncombatant training and service in the Armed
Forces. I, therefore, claim exemption from both combatant and noncombatant training
and service in the Armed Forces." (This statement contains the quotation marks placed
around the word "religious" and has the words "training and" deleted from their
place immediately preceding "belief").
He answered the questions in Series II-Religious Training and Belief in the following manner:
INo"
r"Yes
"1. Do you believe in a Supreme Being?
"Of course, the existence of God cannot be proved or disproven and the essence
of his nature cannot be determined. I prefer to admit this and leave the question
open rather than answer 'yes' or 'no.'
"However, skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God does not necessarily mean
lack of faith in anything whatsoever. The martyrdom of Socrates is sufflcient proof
that irony and skepticism may be consistent with positive faith."
"2. Describe the nature of your belief which is the basis of your claim made in
Series I above, and state whether or not your belief in a Supreme Being involves duties
which to you are superior to those arising from any human relation."
"This brings me to what I believe to be the most ironic result of our commitment to
violence-the tremendous spiritual price that man pays for his willingness to resort to
the mass destruction of human life to perpetrate his 'ideals.'"
"4. Give the name and present address of the individual upon whom you rely most
for religious guidance."
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two convictions were reversed 3 and the third upheld. 4 On writ of
certiorarifrom the United States Courts of Appeal for the Second and
Ninth Circuits, held, exemptions granted. For purposes of the Univer"I rely on no particular person for religious guidance. I resolve spiritual and ethical
problems by reading relevant essays or books, by discussion and debate with colleagues,
and ultimately, by following the dictates of my conscience." (Emphasis added.) Brief
for Respondent, pp. 10-12, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Arno Sascha Jakobson "believed in a 'Supreme Being' who was 'Creator of Man' in
the sense of being 'ultimately responsible for the existence of' man of which 'the
existence of man is the result."' 380 U.S. at 167. He defined religion "as the sum
and essence of one's basic attitudes to the fundamental problems of human existence.
He recognizes an ultimate cause or creator of all existence which he terms 'Godness.'
The central problem of religion is acceptance or rejection of the order of the universe.
He adopted acceptance, which he defined as "total affirmation of the basic blessedness
of the fact of being-of goodness and 'yesness.' The taking of human life is incompatible
with acceptance, which sees in all humanity 'Godness'-the quality of having been
created by the Ultimate Cause." United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409, 412-13
(2d Cir. 1963). "His 'most important religious law' was that 'no man ought ever to
wilfully sacrifice another man's life as a means to any other end."' 380 U.S. at 168.
Forest Britt Peter answered the first question of Series II, supra, "by saying that it
depended on the definition . . ." Id. at 169. "'I suppose you could call that a
belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use."'
Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173, 177 (9th Cir. 1963).
He then referred to a separate sheet of paper on which he had answered the remaining Series II questions:
"Series II.-Religious Training and Beliefs
"2. Since human life is for me a final value, I consider it a violation of moral law
to take human life. I think I have reached this conviction out of my reading of . . .
writings ....
"I consider this belief to be superior to my obligation to the state.
"In so far as this conviction is religious, it has been best described by Rev. John
Haynes Holmes as follows: 'Religion is the consciousness of some power manifest in
nature which helps man in the ordering of his life in harmony with its demands . ..
[it] is the supreme expression of human nature; it is man thinking his highest, feeling
his deepest, and living his best.'
"3. I would say that the source of my conviction concerning the sacredness of
human life and the human spirit has been my experience and study in our democratic
American culture, with its values derived from the western religious and philosophical
tradition. . . . I feel that I have learned the values of this tradion through personal
reading and meditation rather than through experiences in any organized groups.
"6. The use of violence (physical force) comprises the ends one seeks in action. I
consider war to be the greatest example of this. The use of non-violence in the
freeing of India and the Montgomery bus strike is an example of the kind of force I do
believe in." Id. at 174 n.2.
3. In United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1963), the conviction was
reversed on the grounds that the Supreme Being requirement distinguished between
"internally derived and externally compelled beliefs" and was, therefore, an "impermissible classification" under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
In United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), the conviction was reversed and the indictment dismissed because the court could not determine whether
the Selective Service Appeal Board refused the conscientious objector exemption because
Jakobson's beliefs failed to come within the statutory definition or whether he lacked
sincerity.
4. In Peter v. United States, 324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963), the conviction
was upheld because Peter's beliefs were a "merely personal moral code" and thus
expressly excluded from the exemption under the language of the statute.
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sal Military Training and Service Act, the test of "belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being" is whether a given sincere and meaningful belief
occupies a place in the life of its possessor which is parallel to that
filled by an orthodox belief in God. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163 (1965).
Reasonable restraints subordinating socially deviant religious practices to the criminal laws of society5 have traditionally been held
constitutional as falling within the police powers of our government
and not violative of the first amendment. 6 Similarly, freedom in the
practice of religion has been considered subordinate to the nation's
paramount duty of survival. 7 Recognition of war8 as well as peace
exists in the Constitution, and the duty to take up arms in defense of
the nation prevails over personal religious scruples.9 Thus, the war
5. Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1943). An example of the
rationale of this principle is found in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-45 (1890):
"With man's relations to his Maker and the obligations . . . they impose, and the
manner in which an expression shall be made by him of his belief on those subjects,
no interference can be permitted, provided always the laws of society, designed to
secure its peace and prosperity, and the morals of its people, are not interfered with.
However free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the
criminal laws of the country .... Laws are made for the government of actions, and

while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices. . . .Whilst legislation for the establishment of a religion is forbidden, and
its free exercise permitted, it does not follow that everything which may be so called
can be tolerated. Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular
sect may designate as religion."
6. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1878); cf. Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Distinction has been made between religious beliefs and
religious practices. In Reynolds v. United States, supra at 166-67, the Court said:
"Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. . . To permit (the law
to be excused because of practices incident to religious beliefs] . . . would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and
in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist
only in name under such circumstances." But cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
7. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). For the limits to which this
principle has been carried, see United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931);
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 650 (1929), both of which were
overruled on different grounds by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "Congress shall have Power . ..
To declare War . . . and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies...
To provide and maintain a Navy...
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers ....
9. "We are a Christian people . . . according to one another the equal right of
religious freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the
will of God. But, also, we are a Nation with the duty to survive; a Nation whoso
Constitution contemplates war as well as peace; whose government must go forward
upon the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other, that unqualified allegiance
to the Nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as well those
made for war as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with the will of God."
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power clause of the Constitution' ° has been held to support the
requirement of universal military service through conscription" over
objections varying from an illegal delegation of federal power 2 to
involuntary servitude. 13 While there is no constitutional right to
military exemption because of religious beliefs, 14 legislative grace has
historically recognized an exemption from military service for those
who, by reason of their religious beliefs, are opposed to participation
in war.15 These exemptions have been sustained over objections that
they constitute an "establishment of religion" and violate the due
process clause.' 6 While it has been stated that this exemption does
not exist for those who put their private judgment as to participation
in a particular war above the judgment of the nation,' 7 it does exist
for an individual whose religion authorizes theocratic wars as opposed
to those of a national nature. 8
The present statutory language granting an exemption to conscientious objectors by reason of "religious training and ...belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being" was enacted in 1948.'" While the
expression "religious training and belief' existed in the 1940 Draft
21
Act, 20 the legislative definition did not come for another eight years

during which time two judicial definitions had been established. In
defining this term, Congress adopted the language of two court
opinions. The first clause of the definition is found in the nearly
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931), overruled on different grounds
in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
10. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. See pertinent text quoted supra note 8.
11. United States v. Macintosh, supra note 9, at 622; Selective Draft Law Cases,
supra note 7. But see Freeman, Exemption from Civil Responsibilities, 20 Onio ST.
L.J. 437 (1959), where it is contended that the right to exercise religion is absolute
and thus a fortiori there is a right to exemption from military duty.
12. Selective Draft Law Cases, supra note 7, at 389.
13. Id. at 390.
14. Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934);
United States v. Macintosh, supra note 9; United States v. Schwimmer, supra note 7;
George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952);
United States v. Kime, 188 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1951).
15. For a historical outline of conscientious objector provisions, see Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in Light of Torceaso v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J.
252, 256-76 (1963); Donnici, Governmental Encouragement of Religious Ideology:
A Study of the Current Conscientious Objector Exemption From Military Service, 13
J. PuB. L. 16, 25-38 (1964).
16. Selective Draft Law Cases, supranote 7, at 389-90.
17. United States v. Macintosh, supra note 9; United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d
703 (2d Cir. 1943).
18. Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955); Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d
329 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928 (1954).
19. Universal Military Training and Service Act § 6(j), 62 Stat. 613 (1948), as
amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958). See pertinent text quoted supra note 1.
20. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 51(g), 54 Stat. 889 (1940).
21. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 625, § 6, 62 Stat. 609.
22. See note 1 supra.
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identical language of Mr. Justice Hughes in United States v. Macintosh:23 "The essense of religion is belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation."
The distinction between a moralistic philosophy and a religious belief,
as indicated by the Senate Report accompanying the amendment
containing the definition,24 was drawn from Berman v. United States,2
where it was held that "religious training and belief" meant a belief
recognizing responsibility to an authority higher and beyond any
worldly one." 26 Under this definition the court refused to include
within the meaning of the expression a philosophy to which the
individual's conscience required adherence since the philosophy did
not include the historical concept of a deity.27 The court reasoned that
to allow such a philosophy to qualify for the exemption would require
that all individuals holding sincere beliefs of opposition to war, no
matter from whatever source derived, be given equal treatment, and
that if this should happen, the phrase "religious training and belief"
would have no meaning whatsoever. The statutory distinction between
internally derived and externally compelled beliefs was not considered
arbitrary since its basis was supported by reasonable policy and administrative convenience.2 Moreover, this distinction was held constitutional in George v. United States,29 where it was reasoned that since
23. Supra note 9, at 633-34 (dissenting opinion).
24. S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948):
"(j) Conscientious objectors.-This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were found in subsection 5(g) of the 1940 Act. Exemption extends to
anyone who, because of religious training and belief in his relationship to a Supreme
Being, is conscientiously opposed to combatant service or to both combatant and noncombatant military service. (See Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377, cert.
denied, 329 U.S. 795...)"
25. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
26. Id. at 380.
27. "[T]he expression 'by reason of religious training and belief' ... was written...
[to distinguish] between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high
moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an individual's belief in his responsibility to
an authority higher and beyond any worldly one. . . . [T]here are those wvho have a
philosophy in life, and who live up to it. . . . However, no matter how pure and
admirable this standard may be, and no matter how devotedly . . . [it is adhered to],
philosophy and morals and social policy without the concepts of deity cannot be said
to be religion in the sense of the term as it is used in the statute." Id. at 380-81;
accord, Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1956).
28. United States v. Bendik, 200 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1955).
29. Supra note 14. In defining "religious training and belief" the court stated: "It
is couched in terms of the relationship of the individual to a Supreme Being, and
comports with the standard or accepted understanding of the meaning of 'Religion' in
So catholic a definition cannot be considered restrictive because
American Society....
it may not be broad enough to include, and actually excludes certain political,
sociological, moral or philosophical theories unrelated to religion." Id. at 450, 452.
See also Clark v. United States, supra note 27; United States v. DeLime, 223 F.2d
96 (3d Cir. 1955); Bradley v. United States, 218 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1954). But see
United States v. Horst, Crim. No. 36,149, E.D. Mich., Dec. 12, 1957, where it was
held that "love of humanity" is a concept which qualifies as a "Supreme Being."

1965 ]

RECENT CASES

1569

the right to military exemption is statutory, "whatever the Government . . . may take away altogether, it may grant only on certain
conditions... [and] whatever the Government may forbid altogether,
it may condition even unreasonably." 30

The reasoning in the present decision is derived from the other

pre-1948 judicial definition of "religious training and belief' found
in United States v. Kauten.31 Judge Hand's opinion recognized that
in today's skeptical generation conscience and its dictates can substitute for the traditional commandments of God.32 He argued that
no reasonable distinction exists between an individual's response
to an inward compulsion and the teachings of a recognized religious
sect insofar as these things influence one's feelings concerning the
duties owed his fellow men. Conscience and religious impulse occupy
equal positions in the lives of their holders. Since the statute's basis
for exemption is a conscientious objection to war under any circumstances, as distinguished from an opinion that a particular war is
inexpedient, both beliefs qualify for the exemption. The circuit court
opinion in the Seeger33 case followed this view and said, "[whether]
...obeying dictates of his conscience or imperatives of an absolute
morality, it is impossible to say with assurance that one is not bowing
to 'external commands' in virtually the same sense as is the objector
34
who defers to the will of a supernatural power."
In recent decisions, the Supreme Court35 indicated their acceptance
of the Kauten36 definition and reasoning by repudiating the principles
upon which BerMan3 7 and George- were based. These decisions held
that the right to withhold a privilege does not confer a concurrent
30. Supra note 14, at 450.
31. Supra note 17.

32. "[T]he provisions of the present statute

. . .

take into account the characteristics

of a skeptical generation and make the existence of a conscientious scruple against war

in any form, rather than allegiance to a definite religious group or creed, the basis of
the exemption." Id. at 708; accord, United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt, 152 F.2d 627
(2d Cir. 1945); United States ex rel. Brandon v. Downer, 139 F.2d 761 (2d Cir.

1944); United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
33. United States v. Seeger, supra note 3.

34. Id. at 853.
35. Concerning the treatment of religion see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Edue.,

333 U.S. 203, 231-32 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Everson v. Board of Educ..
330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).

For the necessity of granting privileges on constitutional

conditions, see Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In American Communications
Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 417 (1950), the Court said: "This is . . . not
. .

[to say that] Congress, in affording a facility can subject it to any condition it

pleases. It cannot. Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities . . . but if it affords
them it cannot make them available in an arbitrary way .....
(Emphasis added.)
36. See notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text.
37. Berman v. United States, supranote 25.
38. George v. United States, supra note 14.
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right to grant the privilege on unconstitutional conditions,39 and
recognized that the government penalized the free exercise of religion
when it indirectly exerted pressure to forego its practice by disqualify-

ing an individual for a benefit because of his religion.40 Dictum in
Torcaso v. Watkins,41 explicitly repudiated preferential governmental

treatment for religion vis-a-vis non-religious or mere ideological
expression when it stated:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements
which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions
42
founded upon different beliefs.

Thus, until the present decision, Berman43 stood as the law for conscientious objectors although the Supreme Court was repeatedly
reiterating Thomas Jefferson's words that "the clause against estab-

lishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between church and State.'

"4

In the instant decision, the Court traced the history of section 6(j)

and its predecessors, 45 and concluded that by using the expression
"Supreme Being" rather than the designation "God," Congress meant
to embrace all religions and exclude essentially political, sociological,

or philosophical views. 46 The exclusion of the latter views was considered a valid policy decision of Congress which cannot be over-

ridden by the individual's opinion so as to allow him to be a law
unto himself.4 The Court reasoned that by using the words "religious

training and belief" in the 1940 statute, Congress recognized that
opposition to war, as well as religion, was based upon individual

thinking and not membership in any religious sect.48 With over 250
39. Speiser v. Randall, supra note 35.
40. Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 6. In this case South Carolina's unemployment
compensation statute declared any claimant who, without good cause, refused to
accept suitable work when offered was ineligible for such benefits. Claimant, a
Seventh-Day Adventist, refused to accept work on Saturday and applied for unemployment compensation. The Court held that there was no compelling state interest which
allowed the state to infringe the free exercise of religion by denying the claimant her
compensation benefits.
41. Supra note 35. This case held that a public office could not be denied to an
atheist merely because he refused to take an oath declaring his belief in Cod; such an
oath would unconstitutionally invade his freedom of belief and religion.
42. Id. at 495.
43. Supra note 25.
44. Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 35, at 16. See also cases cited in note
35 supra.
45. 380 U.S. at 169-72
46. Id. at 165.
47. Id. at 173.
48. Id. at 172
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sects in the United States, 41 Congress was faced with the difficult
problem of including this vast myriad of religious beliefs within the
exemption without choosing among them. Thus, an orthodox belief
in God could not have been intended when this expression was used;
rather, "Supreme Being" refers to the broader concept of a power or
being "to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is
ultimately dependent."50 While none of the objectors involved claimed
to be atheists, neither did they claim to have monotheistic beliefs.
Their beliefs were theistic, which the Court defined as "the belief in
the existence of god or gods .... Belief in superhuman powers or spiritual agencies in one or many gods."51 Since such beliefs recognize a

power, being, or faith to which all else is subordinate or upon which
all else is ultimately dependent, the three objectors were entitled to
the exemption.
The Senate Report 2 indicated that the present law was intended
to "re-enact 'substantially the same provisions as were found' in the
1940 Act" which referred to "'religious training and belief' without
more."' This explicit statement was considered better evidence of
congressional intent than the quotation from BermanM which the
Court believed was used to show what a religious belief was not,
rather than what it was, and, on this point Berman55 and KautenP6
were in accord. The first clause of the definition was traced to Mr.
Justice Hughes, and it was the Court's belief that his opinion in
Macintosh 7 supports the present interpretation. The Court insisted
that the test presented-whether the claimed belief occupies in the
mind of its possessor the same place that an orthodox belief in God
occupies in the mind of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption-is
objective8 when applied by the trier of fact in determining whether or
not the beliefs are religious. After this question has been determined
the sincerity of the belief must be ascertained. Mr. Justice Douglas'
concurring opinion 9 recognized the necessity of the present strained
interpretation of the statute to avoid any constitutional problems
involved with the free exercise clause of the first amendment and
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. His opinion indicated
that only the present interpretation of this section of the statute would
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 174.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 174.
S. RnP. No. 1268, supra note 24.
380 U.S. at 176.
See S. fPl,. No. 1268, supra note 24, where the relevant portions are quoted.
Supra note 25.
Supra note 17.
Supra note 9 (dissenting opinion).
380 U.S. at 184.
Id. at 188-93.
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allow such non-theistic religions as Hinduism and Buddhism to qualify
for the exemption.
This opinion, which reads "like a short course in theology," 0 demonstrates governmental recognition of the "broad spectrum of religious beliefs among us" and "the diverse manners in which beliefs,
equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated."61 Unless the Court was to retreat from its recent pronouncements, the broad definition given religion in the instant decision
was the only alternative to declaring the statute unconstitutional.
Clearly, the Berman"2 view aided "all religions as against non-believers" and aided "religions based on a belief in the existence of
God as against those religions founded on different beliefs." 3 This
decision effectuates the views of Mr. justice Stewart when he stated:
"In short.., our Constitution commands the positive protection by
government of religious freedom-not only for a minority, however

small-not only for the majority, however large-but for each of us."6

The Court has recognized in the present decision that a transcendental
principle can guide the actions of an individual in the same manner
as do the traditional commandments of God. Thus, any binding
acknowledgment of a Supreme Being, principle, or moral demand
which transcends personal judgment concerning an individuars relations with his fellow man will qualify as a "belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being." It has been suggested that conscientious objectors
can be classified into three categories: 65 religious, moral or ethical, and
sociological or political. The religious objector's opposition to war
is absolute and based upon a spiritual doctrine or quotations from
notable religious leaders. The moral or ethical objector bases his
absolute opposition to war on his love of humanity or a principle
which prohibits him from using violence against his fellow man. The
political or sociological objector is not a pacifist-he possesses no
absolute revulsion to war in general-but believes that a particular
war or war in general is inexpedient and wishes to place his individual
opinion above the judgment of the state.
Prior to the instant decision the religious objector qualified for the
exemption by virtue of the express language of the statute. Now, however, the moral or ethical objector is entitled to exemption also if
his belief is based on a transcendental principle which guides his
actions and which he recognizes as binding upon all men although no
60. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1965, p. 1, col. 7.
61. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1965, p. 15, col. 1.
62. Berman v. United States, supra note 25.
63. Torcaso v. Watdns, supra note 35, at 495.
64. Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 6, at 416 (concurring opinion).
65. Donnici, supra note 15, at 36, 37; Mittlebeeler, Law and the Conscientious Ob.
jector, 20 OnE. L. REv. 301, 306-15 (1941).
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others may recognize it as binding upon themselves. The Court has
recognized that conscience guides his actions and substitutes for the
belief in God which guides the actions of the religious objector. Both
classes of objectors share common beliefs in that they possess a sincere
absolute hatred of war and violence and detest the use of force and
the bearing of arms. The only distinguishing characteristic is the
derivation of their beliefs-one is derived from a Supreme Being and
the other is an inward compulsion. The political objector still will
not qualify for an exemption, because, while he may believe that war
is improper, his beliefs are not based upon a transcendental principle
which he believes should guide all men.66 He derives his views from
his relations with his fellow man and wishes to place his individual
judgment above that of the duly-ordained policy making body of
government. With such a compelling state interest involved in military
67
service, his opinion is rightly overridden by the needs of the nation.
It is believed that only these latter beliefs will now be classified as "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."6 It is interesting to note that the Court painstakingly avoided making any pronouncements concerning atheists. 9
Under the interpretation just presented it appears that an atheistic
objector may or may not qualify for the exemption depending upon
the origin and scope of his beliefs. If they are traced to a transcendental principle, they will qualify him for the exemption as a
moral or ethical objector. The true atheist, however, will refuse to
recognize such a transcendental principle which parallels a belief in
God, and his views will be classified as a mere personal code of morality or as "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical . .. ."
66. If the political objector's views are more than this, he may qualify as a moral
or ethical objector.
67. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 64 at 406.
68. See note 1 supra.
69. Throughout the opinion the Court stresses the requirement of religion as a basis
for claiming the exemption. The Court indicates that precluding non-religious beliefs
from the exemption is a valid policy decision of Congress which cannot be overridden
by individual judgment. 380 U.S. at 173. The Court, id. at 173-74, explicitly states that
this decision does not deal with the question of atheists since none of the parties claim
to be same. Mr. Justice Douglas in a note to his concurring opinion indicates that the
atheist problem is quite different from the pressent issue and refers to Torcaso v.
Watkins, supra note 35, for the possible basis of such a decision. Id. at 193 n.2.
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Constitutional Law-Abatement of Convictions
Occurring Prior to Passage of
Civil Rights Act of 1964
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorariin and consolidated for argument two "sit-in" cases involving convictions for viola.
tions of trespass laws of Arkansas and South Carolina. In each case
the petitioners sought the service of food at a business establishment
open to the public. When they were denied service and ordered
to leave, the petitioners refused to do so. They were then charged and
convicted under state statutes that prohibited persons from remaining
on the premises of a business establishment after having been requested to leave.' On appeal, the state supreme courts affirmed the
convictions. 2 The petitioners asserted both in the state courts and
before the United States Supreme Court a denial of their rights,
privileges and immunities as protected by the fourteenth amendment.
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners also claimed that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,3 which was enacted subsequent to their convictions and the affirmances thereof in the state courts, abated their
convictions. The Supreme Court held, four justices dissenting, although the conduct in question occurred prior to the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, its enactment abated the convictions. Hamm
v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
It is an established tenet of the common law that the repeal of a
penal statute pending prosecution thereunder prevents further prosecution. 4 Although in applying the common law rule, courts seldom
1. ARm. STAT. ANN. § 41-1433 (Supp. 1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-388 (1962).
2. Lupper v. Arkansas, 236 Ark. 596, 367 S.W.2d 750 (1963); Rock Hill v. Hamm,
241 S.C. 420, 128 S.E.2d 907 (1962).
3. 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-1 (1964).
4. The initial exposition of this rule appeared in HALE'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN.
Hale commenting on a statute says "It is observable . . . that when an offense is
made treason or felony by an act of parliament, then those acts are repealed, the
offense committed before such repeal, and the proceedings thereupon are discharged
by such repeal . . . unless a special clause in the act of repeal be made enabling
such proceedings .. " 1 HALE, PLEAs OF Tm CowN 291 (Wilson ed. 1778). Hale
cites no authority for this statement and research has failed to discover a case prior
to his remark. See Levitt, Repeal of Penal Statutes and Effect on Pending Prosecu.
tions, 9 A.B.A.J. 715-16 (1923).
It was not until 1764, over a century after Hale's treatise, that this view was
expressed by the judiciary. Miller's Case, I Wm.Bl. 451, 96 Eng. Rep. 259 (1764).
The judicial decisions of the next century and a half gave effect to the rule and it
became established doctrine of the English common law.
The earliest United States decision expounding the doctrine was United States v.
The Schooner Peggy. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). This was a suit in admiralty
to condemn a schooner as a prize. Pending appeal, a treaty was signed with France
making provision for the return of captured vessels. The Court, in an opinion by
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state the theory upon which the rule is based, an analysis of the cases
reveal the courts variously expressing one or more of four reasons to
justify its application. One is the absence of a law to be enforced.5

The idea seems to be that the law is eradicated, and nothing can be
done to prosecute offenses under a non-existent law. A second reason
is the absence of an offense to be punished.6 The predominant view
here is that the repeal of a criminal statute expresses the legislative
will that the acts which were offenses while the statute was in force
are no longer regarded as criminal.7 A third basis given by some
courts is the release of the offender's guilt.8 These courts employ one
of three ideas: (1) the legislative action repealing the statute is
presumed to be a specific pardon for the past offense; 9 or (2) the

legislative action is a general pardon extended to all those being
prosecuted for the specific conduct forbidden by the repealed
statute; 10 or (3) the legislative action simply erases the guilt of the
accused." The final reason espoused in support of the common law
rule is that the law which gave the court jurisdiction is no longer2
in force, and therefore the court no longer has power to proceed.'

Legislatures have employed various techniques designed to avoid
Chief Justice Marshall, held that the Peggy was to be released, as the power of the
Court to continue had been removed.
The common law rule is applicable where at the time of the repeal of the statute
the defendant has been indicted, Commonwealth v. Marshall, 28 Mass. 350 (1831);
where he has been indicted, but not tried, State v. Cress, 49 N.C. 421 (1857);
where he has been convicted but had not filed appeal, State v. Nutt, 61 N.C. 20
(1866); where after conviction, an appeal has been filed but not argued, United
States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88 (1870); and where an appeal has been argued
but the judgment has not been affirmed, Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322 (1858).
5. "It scarcely requires an examination of the authorities to establish a principle so
plain upon reason as that life cannot be taken under color of the law after the only
law under which it is authorized to be taken has been abrogated by the law-making
power." Hartung v. People, 22 N.Y. 95 (1860).
6. Levitt, supra note 4, at 717-18.
7. "The general rule is that the unqualified repeal of a criminal statute expresses
the legislative will that acts which were offenses under it done while the statute was
in force shall no longer be regarded as criminal, and shall not be punished under the
repealed statute." Vincenti v. United States, 272 Fed. 114 (4th Cir. 1921). See also
Anonymous, 1 Fed. Cas. 1012 (No. 475) (D.D.C. 1872). Another idea is that the
act ceases to exist. United States v. Findlay, 25 Fed. Cas. 1085 (No. 15099) (D.W.D.
Pa. 1869); Howard v. State, 5 Ind. 183 (1854). A third idea is that the acts are
discharged. This means that the acts still exist, but that the consequences are no
longer cognizable by the court. United States v. Tynen, supra note 4.
8. Levitt, supra note 5, at 718-19.
9. Yeaton v. United States, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 281 (1823); Speckert v. Louisville,
78 Ky. 287 (1879); Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322 (1858).
10. United States v. Tynen, supra note 4.
11. Day v. Clinton, 6 Ill. App. 476 (1880).
12. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868); Commonwealth v. Marshall,
28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 350 (1831); State v. Williams, 97 N.C. 455, 2 S.E. 55 (1887);
State v. Mansel, 52 S.C. 468, 30 S.E. 481 (1898). See also Levitt, supra note 4,
at 719-20.
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the common law effect. One form of legislative dissent is a general
savings statute that preserves pending prosecutions under any re14
pealed statute.' 3 In 1871 Congress enacted a federal savings statute.
This statute has been interpreted as furnishing a rule of construction
to be read into subsequent repealing statutes, when not otherwise
provided therein, so as to give effect to the intent of Congress. 15 The
most noted exception to the application of the Federal Savings Statute
occurred when the twenty-first amendment repealed the eighteenth
amendment and the National Prohibition Act passed thereunder. In
United States v. Chambers,6 the defendant was indicted, but was not
brought to trial until after ratification of the amendment. The Court
held that all proceedings pending under the prohibition laws on the
date of ratification were automatically terminated.' 7 The inoperativeness of the Federal Savings Statute was not questioned, since Congress
has no power to qualify the effect of a constitutional amendment. 18
In Bell v. Maryland,19 a recent Supreme Court decision, the petitioners
were convicted under Maryland criminal trespass laws20 as a result
of "sit-in" demonstrations. Subsequent to affirmance by the state court
of appeals,2 ' Maryland enacted a statute 22 abolishing the crime. On
certiorari,the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgments
and remanded the case to the state court. The Court reasoned that a
state's abatement policy was for the state to determine.2
In the instant decision the Court for the first time applied the
13. Another form of legislative dissent is the inclusion of a clause within the repealing statute itself that preserves pending prosecutions.
14. "The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any
penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall
so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for
the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of
such penalty, forfeiture, or liability." 61 Stat. 635 (1947), 1 U.S.C. 109 (1958).
15. Great No. Ry. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452 (1908); United States v. Reisinger,
128 U.S. 398 (1888); United States v. MeNair, 180 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1950);
United States v. Carter, 171 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1948); United States v. Spagnuolo, 168
F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1948); NLRB v. National Garment Co., 166 F.2d 2.33 (8th Cir.
1948); NLRB v. Mylan-Sparta Co., 166 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1948); Business Men's
Life Ins. Co. v. Banker's Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958).
16. 291 U.S. 608 (1934).
17. Ibid. Although Chambers left unanswered whether its rule would apply where
judgment was rendered prior to ratification, and certiorarisought thereafter, the rule
was extended in a per curiam decision shortly after Chambers. Massey v. United
States, 291 U.S. 608 (1934).
18. Chambers v. United States, supra note 16, at 612. See 32 MxcH. L. REv. 700
(1934); 12 N.C.L. REv. 260, 263 (1934); 1 U. Cm. L. REv. 808, 809 (1934).
19. 378 U.S. 226 (1964), convictions aff'd on remand, 236 Md. 356, 204 A.2d 54
(1964). In this, the instant case, rehearing was granted and argument deferred awaiting the outcome of similar issues now pending before the United States Supreme Court.
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 577 (1957).
21. Bell v. Maryland, 277 Md. 302, 176 A.2d 771 (1962).
22. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 11 (Supp. 1963).
23. Supra note 19, at 237.
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common law rule of abatement to a state prosecution, and held that
the state prosecution under state law was abated by the enactment of
a federal statute. This result was reached by a four step reasoning
process. First, the Court found that the facilities at which the petitioners sought service were within the purview of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.24 Second, the Court determined that if the conduct of the
petitioners had occurred subsequent to the passage of the act, it could
not have been the subject of prosecution. The act established as a
federal statutory right the enjoyment of service at a place of public
accommodation. 25 The Court also interpreted the act as immunizing
from prosecution non-violent attempts to exercise the rights granted
by the act.20 In the third step, the Court, relying on the common law
rule of abatement, hypothesized that if federal judgments rather than
state judgments had been rendered but had not become final before
passage of the act, they would have been abated.27 It is irrelevant, the
Court stated, that Congress made no allusion in the act to the problem
of pending prosecutions. 28 The common law principle of abatement
does not depend on imputing to Congress a specific intent in any particular statute. Instead the principle permits an imputation of general
intent to avoid vindictive punishment. 29 Nor is the imputation of a con-

gressional intent barred by the Federal Savings Statute. 30 This statute,
the Court declared, was enacted to preserve prosecutions from "technical" abatement, 31 as where a new statute with more severe penalties
under the common law would abate pending prosecutions. In contrast, the statute is inoperative where, as here, an act substitutes a
right for a crime.1 To support this view the Court cited the Chambers
case. 33 Since the provisions of the act would have abated a comparable federal prosecution, the Court concluded that the same rule,
through the conduit of the supremacy clause, would abate state
prosecutions. 34 The Court added that if the principle of abatement
were not applicable, the Court would have to decide whether the
fourteenth amendment prohibits criminal trespass convictions that
24. Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 309-10 (1964); 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000a, 2000a (b)(2), (c) (1964).
25. 379 U.S. at 310-12; 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, 2000a-1 (1964).
26. 379 U.S. at 311; 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a, 2000a-2 (1964)
provides, "No person shall... punish or attempt to punish any person for exercising or
attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by section 2000a or 2000a-1 of
this title."
27. 379 U.S. at 312-14.
28. Id. at 313.
29. Ibid.
30. Id. at 314.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Supra note 16.
34. 379 U.S. at 314-15.
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enforce racial discrimination. The Court stated that since this question is subject to doubt, and having found that the Civil Rights Act
extends to pending prosecutions, it preferred to avoid the constitutional decision.35 Mr. Justice Douglas, whom Mr. Justice Goldberg
joined concurring, added his belief that the Civil Rights Act not
only removed a burden from interstate commerce, but enforced the
fourteenth amendment right to be free from racial discrimination in
a place of public accommodation. He felt that Congress obviously
intended that state prosecutions for a "crime" that was but a constitutional right should halt.36 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, rejected
the Court's interpretation that the act protected extra-legal assertations of a claimed right,37 and found no indication that Congress intended to compel states to abate prosecutions of lawless conduct
occurring prior to the act.38 Admitting that the common law rule
of abatement might once have been applicable, he asserted that the
Federal Savings Statute presently preserved prosecutions pending at
the time of repeal. 39 Since the Chambers case40 involved a repeal by
constitutional amendment, obviously superseding an act of Congress,
Mr. Justice Black declared that the Court's reliance on this exception
to the savings statute was without foundation. 41 Mr. Justice Harlan
agreed with the Court that the savings statute was inoperative but
only because there was no repeal of a federal statute.42 However, he
refused to accept the extension of the federal criminal abatement doctrine to state prosecutions. 4 3 Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice
White in separate opinions admonished the Court for imputing to
the silence of Congress an intent to abate the pending prosecutions.44
It is submitted that the instant decision is unwise. Since the
trespasses here were non-violent, by persons believing that their
conduct was morally justified, and since Congress has made similar
future conduct lawful, it appears that the infliction of punishment
would be only vindictive. The decision of the Court to establish
retroactively rights in this particular situation is nobly motivated.
However, it appears a more closely reasoned analysis of the controlling
law would require affirmance of the convictions. The supremacy
clause requires subordination of state laws where it is necessary
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.at 316.
Id. at 317-18.
Id. at 318.
Id.at 319.
Ibid.
Supra note 16.
379 U.S. at 320.
Id.at 322 n. 1.
Id.at 324.
Id.at 326-28.
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to carry out a federal purpose. The purpose of the Civil Rights Act
is satisfied by prospective application. All Justices agree that if
Congress expressly sought to abate the prosecutions, it could have
done so. Since the abatement of these prosecutions in light of the
many demonstrators who have been punished prior to 1964 cannot
be said to be necessary for the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the supremacy clause requires abatement only if Congress so
directed. Since Congress did not expressly require abatement, intent
to abate the prosecutions must be inferred. The crux of the Court's
decision is the third step of its reasoning, 45 where it seeks to impute
congressional intent. This reasoning appears unsound because the
imputation of congressional intent to abate the prosecutions is precluded by the Federal Savings Statute. The common presumption
of abatement has been reversed by the adoption of the savings statute
reflecting a congressional policy favoring the preservation of prosecutions. The silence of Congress in view of its own savings statute indicates a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Court. Nor can
the Chambers case,46 relied upon by the Court, provide an exception
to the savings statute. The repeal in that case was by constitutional
amendment, obviously superior to a statute which expresses only congressional intent. The Court's declaration that the savings statute is
meant to obviate only "technical" abatement is not supported by
the language of the statute. 47 The statute expresses a purpose that is
broad and clear-to prevent courts from imputing to Congress an
intent to abate prosecutions. There is no reason for limiting the
savings statute to mere technical abatement. The adoption of the
savings statute reflects a rejection of the common law rule. The
passage of the Civil Rights Act cannot change the fact that the conduct of the petitioners was criminal at the time it was performed.
Of course, it is axiomatic that a penal law presupposes a duty to society
to be obedient. Though subsequent legislation may revoke this duty
as to future conduct, it cannot alter the fact that when the defendant
did the act the duty did exist. A subsequent statute cannot change
the fact that the defendants did the act, nor the fact that a second
45. See text accompanying notes 27-33 supra.
46. Supra note 16.
47. "The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to . . . extinguish any
penalty . . . incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly
provide .... ." 61 Stat. 635 (1947), 1 U.S.C. 109 (1958). Though the preponderance
of cases decided under the Federal Savings Statute involve a "technical" abatement,
there is no indication that the purpose of the statute is limited to this situation. In
fact United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398 (1888), a case decided only a few years
after the enactment of the savings statute, involved an "actual" repeal. In the instant
case, Mr. Justice Black stated that the majority's restriction of the statute to mere
technical repeals is not supported by the language of the statute, it's legislative history,
or the subsequent decisions under it. 397 U.S. at 314.
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legal relation-liability to punishment-was created. 48 The instant
decision requires that Congress hereafter express statute by statute
its desire to preserve convictions pending at the time of repeal, and
this is a burden it renounced in 1871.
Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the decision is the inconsistency between the dismissal of the charges and the philosophical
basis of the civil disobedience4 9 doctrine as practiced by the civil
rights demonstrators. One tenet of this doctrine is an assertion of
the moral right to defy a law that in conscience is evil. Accompanying this concept is a willingness to accept the punishment for defiance
of the law.50 Although the petitioners sought the instant results, the
decision deprived them of the punishment that is the justifying
component of the right to be intentionally disobedient. Functionally
the decision adds to the civil disobedience movement the demand that
if defiance brings about change then those who violated the formerly
valid law are immune from the penalties of lawlessness. This not
only encourages further acts of civil disobedience but strips from the
doctrine the dignifying image of willingness to accept punishment.
Further, this protection from prosecution afforded the proponents of
civil disobedience is a disregard of the fundamental concept that no
society can give its citizens the right to break the law. There can
be no law to which obedience is optional. If a government accepts
the right of citizens to violate the law, it recognizes that no law
exists. Extra-legal redress of grievances is the only means available
to the people of some countries because of their inability to establish
forums of rational judgment. Our problem is more sophisticated. The
advancement of our society is a result of and dependent upon the
utilization of the established forums for the resolution of grievances.
Although the existence of civil disobedience is symptomatic of the
ill of racial discrimination, this imperfection does not justify impairing
the process of law which has facilitated our progress.
48. Levitt, supra note 4, at 717.
49. "[C]ivil disobedience is a course of legally unauthorized conduct engaged in
by relatively homogeneous groups for the redress of grievances. It is conduct outside
the framework of rules provided by established society, believed by the group to be
necessary and desirable but by the society to be detrimental to its established institutions." Riehm, Civil Disobedience-A Definition, 3 A. CGm. L.Q. 11, 12 (1964).
50. Brownell, Civil Disobedience-The Lawyer's Challenge, 3 A. Cmr. L.Q. 27, 28
(1964).
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Escheats-Disputes Between States Concerning
Unclaimed Corporate Obligations
The State of Texas, invoking the original jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court,' sued New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Sun
Oil Company, a New Jersey corporation, for a declaration of its right
to escheat intangible property consisting of debts2 owed by Sun to
persons in and out of Texas who had failed to appear to claim them.
Florida, asserting its own claim to the property, was allowed to intervene in the proceeding. A special master made recommendations
concerning the disposition of the property and further recommended
to the Court that in all such cases a single rule of escheat be followed. 3 Approving the recommendations of the special master, the
Supreme Court held, that each item of property in question was
subject to escheat only by the state of the last known address of the
creditor, as shown by the corporation's books and records. In cases
in which the address of the creditor was unknown, the state of corporate domicile could escheat, provided that another state could
later escheat by proving that the last known address of the creditor
was within its borders. The state of incorporation may also escheat
if the creditor's state has no statute empowering it to take the funds,
but the latter state may subsequently claim the property if it passes
enabling legislation. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965).
This decision by the Supreme Court marks the third stage in the
development of the law of escheat of intangible property held by
debtor corporations domiciled in one state and owed to creditors
who are residents of other states. The steadily increasing costs of
state government have led the states to seek new sources of revenue.
A number of states have statutes designed to allow the state to seize
unclaimed corporate obligations. 4 Serious conflict of laws problems
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1958).

2. The debts consisted of uncashed checks payable to employees for wages and

reimbursable expenses, uncashed checks payable to suppliers for goods and services,
uncashed checks payable to lessors of oil and gas producing land as royalty payments,
unclaimed "mineral proceeds," uncashed checks payable to shareholders for dividends
on common stock, unclaimed refunds of payroll deductions owing to former employees,
uncashed checks payable to various small creditors for minor obligations, undelivered
fractional stock certificates resulting from stock dividends.
3. For a more complete discussion of the facts of this case, see text accompanying
note 20 infra.
4. E.g., CAL. Civ. P.Roc. CODE §§ 1500-27; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 717.01-30 (Supp.
1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:37-11 to -44 (1952); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 241-301
(1958); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 3272a (Supp. 1964). For an analysis of various
state statutes and a discussion of escheat from the viewpoint of the corporate counsel,
see Ely, Escheats: Perils and Precautions, 15 Bus. LAw. 791 (1960); McBride, Un-

claimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes, and the Corporation Lawyer, 14 Bus. LAw. 1062

(1959).
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have arisen where states have attempted to employ their statutes to
seize property owed to their residents by out-of-state corporations or
owed by their corporations to residents of other states.- The first
stage in the Supreme Court's development of the law in this area is
illustrated by the 1947 case of Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Moore.6 In this case, various insurance companies appealed from
a decision by the New York Court of Appeals which upheld the
constitutionality of a New York statute 8 under which the state was
allowed to seize the unclaimed proceeds of certain policies. The
insurance companies were all incorporated outside New York, but
the policies had been issued to persons who had been residents of
the state at the time of issue. The Supreme Court affirmed the New
York court, holding that the state had sufficient "contacts" with the
transactions at issue to take custody of the proceeds. The Court,
however, expressly reserved the question of whether New York might
take these moneys if the owners or beneficiaries were not residents
at the time the policies matured. This reservation was in effect a
modification of the holding of the New York court which had not
interpreted the statute as so limiting the power of the state. 9 In a
customarily articulate dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued that
the case should be analyzed as one between various states with competing claims to the policy proceeds and not as one between New
York and the insurance companies. The Court had occasion in 1950
to consider the problem further in Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey.10
In this case Standard Oil, a firm incorporated in New Jersey, was sued
by that state to escheat unclaimed corporate dividends and shares
of corporate stock. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
property was escheatable to the state under its statute,' and the
company appealed on the ground that the statute was unconsti5. See also CHEATm, GoonicirH, GIUsWoLD, & RESE, CoNFICrs Or LAws 730-32
(4th ed. 1957); 62 COLUm. L. REv. 708 (1962); 65 HAnv. L. REV. 1408 (1952); 17
V rm. L. REv. 1354 (1964).
6. 333 U.S. 541 (1947). Compare Anderson Natl Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233
(1944); Security Say. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
7. 297 N.Y. 1, 74 N.E.2d 24 (1947).
8. N.Y. ABAND. Pnop. LAw §§ 700, 703.
9. The insurance companies initiated the proceeding in the state courts as a suit
for declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the New York statute. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 271 App. Div. 1002, 69 N.Y.S.2d 323, affirmlng
187 Misc. 1004, 65 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1946). It was apparently not known by
the Supreme Court whether the owners and beneficiaries of the policies still lived in
the state. One of the grounds for Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent was his belief that
the judgment was hypothetical and therefore established dangerous precedent. 333
U.S. at 541, 554.
10. 341 U.S. 428 (1950).
11. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2:53-16, 17 (1937); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 5 N.J.
281, 74 A.2d 565 (1950).
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tutional. 2 The majority, through Mr. Justice Reed, held that even
though the unclaimed property was not kept at the New Jersey
office, and even though the owners' whereabouts were completely
unknown, the state had by service of process seized the res, i.e., the
debts, and was therefore exercising rightful jurisdiction over them.
In answer to the argument raised by the company to the effect that
the judgment would not protect it from future liability to the owners
or to other states which might have claims to the property, the Court
said that the company could not be subjected to further liability
because the judgment had been rendered in connection with the res,
that the debts had thereby been taken from the company by the
state, and that the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in
any other jurisdiction.13 The Court carefully noted, however, that
no other state had asserted a claim to the property in that proceeding,
and stated that the determination of the merits of New Jersey's claim
in contrast to the claims of other states would have to await presentation of the other claims before the Court. Again Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented, and following the rationale of the majority, suggested
that one state having a claim to uncollected corporate obligations
might foreclose the claims of other states if it could effect service of
process on the debtor corporation before its sister states could act.
In short, he deplored a rule of law that would make the rights of
various states dependent upon a "race of diligence."
In 1961, the Court reached the second stage in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania.14 This case involved money which
had been paid to the Western Union Co., a New York corporation, in
Pennsylvania by purchasers of telegraphic money orders for money
to be transmitted to payees in Pennsylvania and other states. In
numerous instances the company was unable either to deliver the
money orders or to return the funds to the senders. The proceeds of
many transactions had therefore accumulated, and the State of
Pennsylvania sought to escheat all of them under its escheat statute.15
Western Union showed that New York was asserting a claim to certain of the same funds, and argued that a judgment by the Pennsylvania court would not bar New York from escheating the same
property since New York could not be made a party to the Pennsylvania proceeding. The Court voted unanimously to reverse the
decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which had upheld
12. The primary constitutional objection set forth was that the state court judgment
amounted to a deprivation of the company's property without due process of law in
violation of the fourteenth amendment because it did not protect the company from
later liability to the owners or to other states.
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.

14. 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
15.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 333 (1958).
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the power of the state to escheat. 16 The majority opinion was based
solely on the ground that the Pennsylvania court's decision worked a
denial of due process against the company because it did not protect
the company from the possibility of multiple liability. The Court
thereby recognized, through Mr. Justice Black's opinion, the same
basic principle for which Mr. Justice Frankfurter had contended in
the earlier cases; namely, that in these circumstances the real
adversary parties were states with competing claims to the abandoned
property. An attempt was made to distinguish Connecticut Mutual'1
and Standard Oil18 rather than to disapprove them. The unfortunate
language of the Standard Oil case that the full faith and credit clause
would protect the debtor corporation from multiple liability was
largely sidestepped by the Court as it pointed out that in that case
there had been no actual claims by other states, and that the Court
in that case had alluded to the possibility that such competing
claims could yet be brought before it. The opinion in the instant
case noted that a real controversy between states was in the offing,
although, of course, no state but Pennsylvania was actually before
the Court. The Court added, however, that in some of the earlier
cases it would have been easy to detect other states' interests in the
abandoned property in issue. Despite the Court's efforts to reconcile
its prior decisions, it is clear that Western Union 9 signalled a very
real change in its attitude toward the overall problem. There is in
this case an express recognition by the Court that a debtor corporation whose obligations are held by creditors in states outside the
debtor's state of incorporation may well be faced with multiple claims
by the various interested states if the creditors fail to collect their
money. The Court stated that the proper procedure in such circumstances was for those states to invoke the original jurisdiction of the
Court under article III, section 2 of the Constitution. The Western
Union decision was a significant contribution to stability in what was
becoming an increasingly serious conflict of laws problem, but it
failed to provide a substantive rule for the determination of future
cases, choosing rather to rely upon case by case analysis.
The principal case results from the Court's further reflection on
the subject, and its apparent realization that it had indeed created for
itself an excessive burden in the Western Union holding. In this case,
the Sun Oil Company, a New Jersey corporation, owed some 26,461
dollars to approximately 1730 small creditors who had failed to
16.
17.
18.
19.

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 400 Pa. 337, 162 A.2d 617 (1960).
Supra note 6.
Supra note 10.
Supra note 14.
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collect over periods ranging from seven to forty years.2 0 Some of
the creditors were last known to reside in Texas and other states, but
the addresses of others were unknown. The obligations were either
recorded on the books of Sun in its two Texas offices or were owed to
people whose last known addresses were in Texas or both. Texas
argued that the "most significant contacts" theory should control the
disposition of the funds. It further contended that the debts should
be treated as situated in Texas, and reasoned that if this were done,
it would have the most significant contacts with the transactions.
New Jersey asserted its right to the property as the state of incorporation of the debtor. Pennsylvania argued that it should be allowed to
escheat the funds on the ground that Sun maintained its principal
place of business in that state. Florida claimed certain of the funds
on the ground that some of the creditors had their last known address
in that state. The Court rejected three of these arguments and
adopted the fourth with modifications. The Texas contention was
rejected because it was decided that, while the "most significant
contacts" theory was followed in private litigation involving conflicts
problems, in cases between states it would serve to "leave in permanent turmoil a question which should be settled once and for all
by a clear rule which will govern all types of intangible obligations
like these ... ."21 The Court pointed out that the rule contended
for by Texas would leave each case to be decided on its own facts,
and that the necessity for this was precisely what the Court was
striving to obviate. The argument of New Jersey was likewise found
to be unacceptable. The Court conceded that a rule based on this
argument would have clarity and ease of application, but felt that
these virtues could be achieved in another way which would give
proper weight to factors more compelling than the place of incorporation. The fact that Sun maintained its principal offices in Pennsylvania
was one such factor, but Pennsylvania's claim was also rejected. The
Court felt that since the obligations amounted to a liability to Sun,
there was little to be said for making them an asset to the state
where it happened to maintain its principal offices. Perhaps more
persuasive to the Court was its realization that the determination in
future cases of just which state is the place of a corporation's main
business activity would itself raise the very uncertainty which the
Court was attempting to put to rest. Florida, asserting the one argument which could possibly be relevant for it in this case, caught
and held the ear of the Court. Escheat by the state of the last known
address of the creditor provides a rule which "leaves no legal issue
20. Supra note 2.
21. Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 678 (1965).
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to be decided." 22 Moreover, since the debt is the property of the
creditor rather than the debtor corporation, the Court found an
inherent fairness in allowing the state of his last known address
to escheat. The Court analogized to cases which held that intangible
property is subject to death taxes by the state of the owner's
domoile.2 3 It emphasized that it was interested in the last known
address of the creditor as recorded on the books of the debtor corporation, and not in "technical legal concepts of residence and domicile
.... "2

It also recognized that cases may arise in which the creditor

will have a listed address in a state different from the one in which
he lived when the obligation arose or where the escheat proceedings
were commenced. But, the Court said, these errors, "if indeed they
could be called errors, probably will tend to a large extent to cancel
each other out."25 In cases in which the state of last known address
has no statute empowering it to escheat unclaimed corporate obligations, the state of incorporation of the debtor will be allowed to
escheat subject to the condition that should the state of the creditor's
address later pass enabling legislation, it will then be able to escheat
the property from the other state. Similarly, if the creditor has no
listed address the state of incorporation may escheat, but if a state is
later able to prove that the creditor had his last known address within
its borders it may take the property. Mr. Justice Stewart dissented,
contending that only the state of the debtor's incorporation should
be allowed to escheat.
This decision by the Supreme Court falls within the category of
situations in which the establishment of a clear and easily applied
rule appears to be the most important consideration. It had previously
been suggested that proper handling of the problem might call for
a rule based on considerations other than those which usually
control in cases involving conflict of laws questions, 26 and the
very rule adopted by the Court had been suggested as being preferable to other alternatives. 27 Nevertheless, it is difficult to conclude that the chosen rule is clearly better in every respect than
those that were rejected. It is on balance a good rule, however, and
should generally prove capable of easy application by administrative
22. Id. at 681.
23. Here the Court cited the following cases: Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586
(1930); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930); Blodgett v.
Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928). But of., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193
(1936); Schoener v. Continental Motors Corp., 362 Mich. 303, 106 N.W.2d 774
(1961). The Court went on to point out, however, that in garnishment cases suit may
be brought against a debtor's obligor wherever be may be found. 379 U.S. at 681.
24. Supra note 21, at 681.
25. ibid.
26. CHATHAm, GooDaiCH, GsuswoLD, & REE E, op. cit. supra note 5, at 730.
27. 17 V.4s. L. IEv. 1354, 1360 (1964).
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procedures without the necessity for resorting to litigation. In this
the Court accomplished what it set out to do.28 It is therefore likely

that any by-passing of traditional legal analysis which may seem
apparent will be more than compensated for by the fact that the
successful state will be able to preserve more of the proceeds it is
entitled to escheat because it will be saved the expense of litigating
its claim in court. In addition, since the creditors of corporations
will, in the aggregate, probably represent a larger number of states
than will the debtor corporations based on their state of incorporation,

application of the rule will bring about a broader and fairer distribution of the funds held as unclaimed corporate obligations. 29
28. The Court has added emphasis to its decision by rendering a "final decree" subsequent to its regular opinion. Texas v. New Jersey, 380 U.S. 518 (1965). The
decree is in harmony with the earlier opinion, but is more precisely drawn. It
expressly makes the rule of the case applicable in connection with statutes which
empower the state to take "custody" of unclaimed corporate obligations as well as
those which empower the state to "escheat" such property. The tenor of the opinion
and the decree clearly is that the Court desires and expects to be relieved of the
burden of deciding future disputes between states concerning unclaimed corporate
obligations.
29. The rule announced in the principal case will of course apply only in cases involving claims by various states of the union to property owned by citizens of this
country. A somewhat related but considerably more complex problem is presented when
the government of one nation seizes property belonging to a citizen of another nation.
See Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931); Direction Der Disconto-Cesellschaft
v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22 (1925); REsTATENENT, Foa~mx RELATOsS
LAw oF rz UmTm STATES §§ 190-97 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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Labor Law-Failure To Bargain-Employer Required
To Bargain With Respect to His Proposal To
Contract Out Work
Defendant corporation operated a manufacturing plant where the
plaintiff union was the exclusive bargaining representative for a unit
of the company's maintenance employees. Shortly before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement,' the company notified
the union that since it had determined that substantial savings could
be effected by contracting out2 the work to an independent contractor, 3
it had reached a definite decision to replace the employees of the
union. The company pointed out "since we will have no employees
in the bargaining unit covered by our present Agreement, negotiation of a new or renewed Agreement would appear to us to be
pointless." 4 The union filed unfair labor practices against the company,
alleging violations of sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(5).5 The trial
examiner's recommendation that the complaint be dismissed was
accepted by the Board.6 Upon reconsideration, 7 the Board recognized
that the company acted from an economic rather than an anti-union
motivation, but found that the company's failure to negotiate concerning the contracting out of its maintenance work constituted a violation
of section 8(a) (5) of the act. The Board also ordered the company to
reinstate the employees with back pay. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia granted the Board's petition
for enforcement.8 On certiorarito the United States Supreme Court,
1. Efforts by the union to have a bargaining session on the proposed modifications
met with no success until only four days before the expiration date of the existing
agreement.
2. "Contracting out" has no precise meaning. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 13-17,
Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). See also Lunden,
Subcontracting Clauses in Major Contracts, 84 MotriuLy LAB. REv. 579 (1961).
3. The independent contractor was primarily to furnish labor as the company normally
purchased tools, supplies and equipment.
4. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
5. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in § 7." National
Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) (1958); "(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization ...... National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 49 Stat. 452
(1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §
431 (Supp. V, 1963): "(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees ...." National Labor Relations Act § 8(a) (5), 49 Stat. 453 (1935),
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1958).
6. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961).
7. The court observed that this ruling was based upon a similar decision in Town
& Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
8. 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963).

RECENT CASES

1589

held, an employer is required to bargain with representatives of the
union with respect to his proposal to contract out work now performed
by these employees in order to effect economic savings; and that the
NLRB has authority to order the company to resume the subcontracted
operation and reinstate the displaced employees with back pay.
FibreboardPaper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
Subcontracting or "contracting out" refers to a managerial decision
to have all or a portion of its plant operation or production which
could be or has been performed by the existing bargaining unit performed by an outside firm. It has been held by the NLRB that the
contracting out of work may become an unfair labor practice under
sections 8(a) (1), 8(a) (3), and 8(a) (5) of the Act. A clear example
of a section 8(a) (3) violation would be the discharge of certain employees in the process of contracting out if the discharges were
traceable to union activity. Under 8(a) (5), that section with which
the instant case is primarily concerned, the employer has a statutory
duty to bargain with the authorized employee representative about
wages, hours and conditions of employment including changes thereof;
and, therefore, when the employer contracts out work in order to
avoid this obligation or in absence of contractual permission makes
unilateral changes, he has violated the act. In essence, the employer
has two duties: first, to refrain from discriminating against employees
in the bargaining unit and, secondly, to bargain over decisions substantially affecting the wages, hours, and conditions of employment of
those in the bargaining unit including contracting out decisions. To
phrase it another way: to bargain as to the decision and as to the
effect of the decision upon employees represented by the collective
bargaining agent. It appears that collective bargaining concerning
subcontracting or "contracting out" is, in fact, a routine matter
throughout American industry.9 The alleged violation of failure to
bargain in this area can arise in many ways. Among the more frequent
factual situations concerning "contracting out" are the following:
(1) where work that could have been performed at the plant is sent
out for performance at another location, (2) where work that is being
performed at the plant is sent out for performance at another location,
(3) where a subcontractor with more advanced equipment and
knowledge performs the work within the plant, (4) where existing
jobs are jeopardized by mechinization or by plant consolidations or
mergers, and (5) where an employer decides to sell his product
9. A Labor Department study analyzed 1,687 bargaining agreements covering nearly
50% of the work force under such agreements and found that approximately 25%
contained some type of limitation on subcontracting. See Lunden, supra note 2, at
581, discussing BURAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, SUBcoNTBACTiNG
CrAUss XN MAJOR CoLLECTrvE BARGAINNG AGREEmENTs (Bulletin No. 1304, 1961).
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through independent distributors rather than through a sales force
of his own. In Timken Roller Bearings Co.,10 a 1946 decision, the
employer argued that the "continuance of a practice of sub-contracting
certain production and maintenance work to private contractors...,,n
was not a matter about which it was required to bargain. The Board
held to the contrary and affirmed the Trial Examiner's decision which
read in part:
[I]t seems apparent that the respondents system of subcontracting work
may vitally affect its employees by progressively undermining their tenure of
employment in removing or withdrawing more and more work, and hence
12
more and more jobs, from the unit.

Similar holdings and observations have been made in subsequent
decisions dealing with an employer's violation of his duty to bargain
when he unilaterally contracts out his employees' jobs without bargaining.'3 Two more recent decisions clearly support the holding in the
instant case that "contracting out" is a mandatory subject of bargaining. In Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver,14 a case distinguished
from the instant case only that in Oliver the work of the employees
was let out piecemeal, whereas in the instant case the contracting
out was of the work of the entire unit, the conclusion was reached
that such a matter was a subject of mandatory bargaining under
section 8(d). In Town & Country Mfg. Co.,15 the majority observed that the Supreme Court's decision in Railroad Telegraphers6
foreclosed any discretion of the Board to find that an employer's
decision to contract out is, or is not, a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The Town & Country decision is also very important since the Board
held that contracting out is a mandatory subject of bargaining,
notwithstandingan employer's valid economic motivations.The instant
case relied upon this reasoning. A similar decision was reached in
the Hawaii Meat 7 case. This view was rejected by the Eighth Circuit
in the Adams Dairy18 case-the case which constituted the "alleged
10. 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947).
11. Id. at 511.
12. Id. at 518.
13. Smith's Van & Transport Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1059 (1960); Brown-Dunkin Co.,
125 N.L.R.B. 1379 (1959), enforced, 287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961); Shamrock Dairy,
Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 998 (1957), enforced, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 892 (1960).
14. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
15. Supra note 7.
16. Ibid. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago N.W.R. Co., 362 U.S. 330

(1960).

17. Hawaii Meat Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 966 (1962).
18. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1963). The Adams case
has recently been remanded to the 8th Circuit for reconsideration in light of Fibreboard.
85 Sup. Ct. 613 (1965).
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conflict among the Courts of Appeal" 19 and prompted the Supreme
Court to grant certiorariin the instant case. The Eighth Circuit held
that a company was not guilty of an unfair labor practice by contracting out work when there was no anti-union motivation but instead
a legitimate business purpose. It should also be mentioned that the
Board's remedial order requiring the company to resume its maintenance operations and reinstate employees with partial back pay is
supported by prior decisions. 20 Section 10(c) of the act has been
held to give wide discretion to the Board "to mould remedies suited
to practical needs." 21 That the policy followed by the Board in the
22
instant case was not unusual was pointed out in Herman Sausage Co.,
"It is the Board's customary policy to direct a respondent-employer
to restore the status quo where he has taken unlawful unilateral
action to the detriment of his employees." 23 It should be noted that
very recent decisions of the NLRB have shed additional light on the
Board's Fibreboard doctrine.2 A parallel factual situation, differing
from the instant case only in the degree of work taken away
from the bargaining unit, was present in the case of Textile Workers
v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,2 There the Supreme Court held that while
an employer has the absolute right completely to terminate his
business for any reason, he does not have a similar right to close part
of his business, to shift work to another plant, or to open a new plant
to replace a closed plant, if the action is motivated by a desire to
prevent unionization. The rationale behind all decisions calling for
negotiations in these situations is that such an action constitutes a
change in terms and conditions of employment which an employer
can not unilaterally make without first bargaining with the union.
The decided cases all place an emphasis on the fact that the collective
bargaining machinery must be utilized and that unilateral action, if
allowed, would run directly counter to the purposes and policies of
the act. A question now seemingly answered is whether or not
"contracting out" is a matter about which employers are required to
bargain. As early as 1941, the NLRB held that an employer is
19. 379 U.S. at 644.
20. E.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953); NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Television Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
21. 344 U.S. at 351-52. National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958), provides that upon finding an unfair labor
practice the Board "shall issue . . . an order requiring such person to cease and
desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of
this subchapter."
22. 122 N.L.R.B. 168 (1958), enforced, 275 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1960).
23. Id. at 172.
24. See notes 39-40 infra.
25. 152 N.L.R.B. No. 96 (1965).
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obliged to bargain with his employee's representative about transferring work from one plant to another26--an action that certainly seems
analagous to "contracting out." The Board has consistently followed
that decision.2 7
The Court in the instant case advanced several major reasons for
its decision that "contracting out" of plant maintenance work is
covered by the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" within
the scope of section 8(d) and therefore, that the company's unilateral
conduct in this case constituted a refusal to bargain which was a
violation of section 8(a) (5). The Court did not rely upon precedent
in reaching its decision, although it did cite with approval the
Timken and Oliver2 cases, and stated that it agreed with the holding
in these cases that "such a matter is a subject of mandatory bargaining.":2 One of the Court's strongest points was that "the inclusion
of 'contracting out' within the statutory scope of collective bargaining
also seems well designed to effectuate the purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act." 0 The Court viewed the company's action of
unilaterally contracting out the work as having the result of frustrating
the purpose of the act; that such disputes should be submitted "to
the mediatory influence of negotiations." 31 The Court placed as much
emphasis on a related point-that "the conclusion that 'contracting out'
is a statutory subject of collective bargaining is further reinforced by
industrial practices in this country." 32 While recognizing that this is
not a finally determinative factor, the Court felt it significant that
experience showed that such a subject had been frequently and
successfully dealt with by the collective bargaining process. It was
pointed out in the instant case that such matters as "reducing the
work force, decreasing the fringe benefits, and eliminating overtime
payments" 33 have by prior practice and decisions been recognized
as subjects "peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective
bargaining framework."3 Since the Court recognized that the Company's decision to subcontract or "contract out" the maintenance work
was motivated by the savings in cost that it could achieve by "reducing
26. Gerity Whitaker Co., 33 N.L.R.B. 393 (1941), enforced in pertinent respects, 137
F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 763 (1943).
27. See Rapid Bindery, Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 212 (1960), enforced in part, 293 F.2d
170 (2d Cir. 1961); California Footwear Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 765 (1955), enforced in
pertinent respects. 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957); Bickford Shoes, Inc., 109 N.LR.B.
1346 (1954); Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
28. Supra notes 12 & 16.
29. 379 U.S. at 213.
30. Id. at 210-11.
31. Id. at 211.
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 213.
34. Id. at 214.
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the work force," it further reasoned that these matters were therefore
clearly subject to the bargaining process. In short, the company
replaced existing employees with those of an independent contractor
to do the same work under similar conditions of employment. The
opinion dealt briefly with the somewhat secondary question of whether
the Board was empowered under section 10(c) to order the resumption of maintenance operations and employees' reinstatement with
back pay. The Court felt that the Board's order restoring the status
quo was an effective manner of promoting the purposes of the act. It
also stated that there was no evidence that the remedial decision
would work an undue burden on the company.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, joined by Mr. Justice
Douglas and Mr. Justice Harlan, spoke of the opinion as having
"implications of such disturbing breadth."35 The main argument of
the concurring opinion is that:
There are passages in the Court's opinion today which suggest just such an
expansive interpretation, for the Court's opinion seems to imply that any
issue which may reasonably divide an employer and his employees must be
the subject of compulsory collective bargaining.36

The concurring justices would prefer a narrower view of "conditions
of employment" for they feel that (1) the statutory purpose is to
delineate a limited class of issues which are to be subjects of mandatory bargaining, and (2) there is a possibility that many managerial
decisions that may have only remote effect on the question of job
security may be interpreted as being subject to mandatory bargaining.
The concurring Justices stated that they "do not believe that an
employer's subcontracting practices are, as a general matter, in themselves conditions of employment."3 This view is the crux of the
conflict between the Court's opinion and that of the concurring
opinion.
Within a few months of the Fibreboarddecision, the NLRB handed
down several decisions whose effect was to clarify and emphasize
the limitations of the doctrine, and to dispel the fear of the dissenters.
In the Westinghouse Electric Corp.m case, involving the unilateral
letting of over 8,000 outside contracts, the Board set out a number
of criteria for determining whether an employer must bargain about
a decision to subcontract. The Board observed that such a unilateral
act would be upheld where these tests are met: the contracting out
procedure must follow traditional methods of company operation;
it cannot significantly differ in kind or degree from the company's
established subcontracting practice; recurring and economic considera35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 218 (concurring opinion).
Id. at 221.
Id. at 224.
150 N.L.R.B. No. 136 (1965).
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tions must furnish the sole motivation; it can have no demonstrable

adverse effect on the employees in the unit; and the union must have
an opportunity to bargain at general negotiating meetings about the
proposed changes. These tests, as applied in recent cases, 39 call for
strict limitations on the Fibreboarddoctrine. It is also important to
note that the Board has referred to specific management right contract
clauses as reasons for clearing employers of charges of contracting
out violations. 40 In one of these cases, the clause gave the company
an unrestricted power to "alter, rearrange or change, extend, limit or
curtail its operations or any part thereof."41
The instant case clearly settles any doubts that "contracting out"
is a matter about which an employer must bargain. The Court's
opinion carefully presented the rationale behind its decision-bargaining on such "conditions of employment" effectuates the purpose of
the act in submitting these disputes to the "mediatory influence of
negotiation."42 The decision seems correct, for if the position of the
company was sustained, it would mean that an employer could almost
unilaterally eliminate some or all of his employees' jobs by contracting
out their work and lawfully refusing to even discuss with the
union any proposals which would strengthen its members' job security
by restricting management's right to contract out their work. If the
collective bargaining process is to meet its goal of reconciling the
conflicts between labor and management, the act must be held to
require bargaining on such matters as what jobs will be available
to the employees under such an agreement.
The reasoning behind the concurring opinion presented a valid
argument, "it surely does not follow that every decision which may
43
affect job security is a subject of compulsory collective bargaining."
justices Stewart, Douglas and Harlan, however, failed to specify the
"passages in the Court's opinion .

.

. which .

.

. seem to imply that

any issue which may reasonably divide an employer and his employees
must be the subject of compulsory bargaining."" It is unusual that
such an implication was drawn in light of the Court's observation
that "our decision need not and does not encompass other forms of
'contracting out' or 'subcontracting' which arise daily in our complex
39. Empire Terminal Warehouse Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 125 (1965); General Tube
Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (1965); Allied Chemical Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1965);
American Oil Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 45 (1965); Fofrir Bearing Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No.
40 (1965); Superior Coach Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1965).
40. International Shoe Co., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 78 (1965); Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B.
No. 161 (1965); General Motors Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1964); Shell Oil Co., 149
N.L.R.B. No. 26 (1964).
41. Kennecott Copper Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1964).
42. 379 U.S. at 211.
43. Id. at 223 (concurring opinion).
44. Id. at 221.
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economy." 45 While the concurring opinion correctly sensed that the
decision in the instant case favored a liberal concept of what constitutes "conditions of employment," their apprehensions as to the
broad implications of the decision do not seem to be warranted on
the face of the Court's opinion, and particularly in light of recent
decisions that adopt a more restrictive view of Fibreboard.4 An
important secondary aspect of the instant case is the impact it may
have on an arbitrator's decision as to the right of a company to
"contract out" during the life of an agreement. While this is a
complex question, the answer seems to be that the decision of the
arbitrator should be no different after Fibreboardthan before, assuming identical facts. This answer is largely due to the fact that the
decision did not change existing law, for as it has been pointed out
above, the law prior to Fibreboardwas that "contracting out" was a
subject for mandatory bargaining. 47
Fibreboardwill be a landmark decision in labor relations. It clearly
evidences a tendency to recognize the importance of job security
in our age of large unemployment and ever increasing mechanization.
The importance of this decision may well center in the liberal language
the Court used in expanding their view of "conditions of employment."
While it appears that the principle of the "entering wedge"48 may
take on added importance as labor gains an increased voice on traditional management decisions, fears that every managerial decision
affecting job security is a subject for mandatory bargaining do not
seem justified on the face of the opinion, particularly if the Westinghouse test4 9 continues to be applied as it recently has been. It would
appear that "contracting out" may be upheld where the Board studies
the past history of "contracting out" in the particular concern and the
presence or absence of specific management right clauses in the collective bargaining agreements. When the Board looks to the adverse
effect or substantial detriment to employees in the unit, it is submitted that the Board is moving, perhaps unwisely and unjustifiably,
into the role of determining what is good or bad for employees, employers, and particularly unions.
45. Id. at 215.
46. See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
47. Feller & Fairweather. The FibreboardDecision and Subcontracting: Two Views,
19 Arm. J. (n.s.) 70 (1964). This article contains an excellent and complete discussion
of this limited aspect of the instant case.
48. "It seems probable that once a union has successfully asserted its voice within
one of the broad categories of management authority, it is a somewhat simpler matter
for it to spread its penetration within that category, among the several managerial
areas comprising it ... .This is the principle of the 'entering wedge' . . . it provides
a beachhead from which further penetration may be carried to related activities."
Anzm, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONTROL 46-47 (1948).
CiAwim
49. See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
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Professions-Canon Twenty of the Canons of
Professional Ethics Interpreted To Ban
Statements to News Media
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to
life imprisonment. He contends, inter alia, that his motions for mistrial
should have been granted because improper and prejudicial stories
appeared in local newspapers while the jury was being drawn. On
October 7, 1963, the day on which the first juror was accepted, the
Paterson Evening News published an article saying that the "state is
seeking the death sentence for the construction worker accused of
brutally beating to death his estranged wife, Carol .... ." The story,
after referring to the wife's flight from her apartment, closely pursued
by the defendant, and the alleged fatal beating in an alleyway, continued "Van Duyne was nabbed in a phone booth by police a short
time later. Police quoted him as saying, 'You've got me for murder.
I don't desire to tell you anything."' An article in the Paterson
Morning Call on October 8 added that "According to police, Van
Duyne had been arrested at least 10 times and had once threatened
to 'kill a cop.' Authorities reported after his arrest that Van Duyne
beat up a man during the summer in 1962 and then threatened Detective William Toomey with a gun."' On October 9, and on October 11,
similar stories appeared. After publication of each article defendant
moved for a mistrial, but his motion was refused in each case. In
response to the first motion, however, the court permitted counsel to
re-open voir dire to examine the jurors already chosen as to the
effect of the articles and ordered immediate sequestration of jurors
as they were accepted. In addition, the court advised counsel that a
liberal examination of prospective jurors would be permitted to determine the effect, if any, of the articles. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of New Jersey, held, affirmed. Independent examination of the
record revealed that it did not contain sufficient evidence that the
newspaper articles prevented a fair trial or that they so infected the
minds of the jurors as to leave them biased against the defendant.
State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
Of more significance, however, is Judge Francis' dictum interpreting Canon Five 2 and particularly Canon Twenty3 of the Canons of
1. None of these accusations were proved in the trial.
2. Canon V reads: "It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a
person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of
the accused; otherwise innocent persons, victims only of suspicious circumstances,
might be denied proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer is bound
by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense that the law of the
land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by
due process of law."
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Professional Ethics to ban statements to news media by prosecutors,

assistant prosecutors, their lawyer staff members and defense attorneys
as to alleged confessions or inculpatory admissions by the accused,
or to the effect that the case is "open and shut" against the defendant,
or with reference to the defendant's prior criminal record either of
convictions or arrests. Further, as concerns prosecutor's detectives
and members of local police departments who are not members of
the bar, statements of the type described constitute conduct unbecoming a police officer. As such they warrant discipline at the hands
of the proper authorities. 4

Although New Jersey is the first state to interpret Canon Twenty to
ban such disclosures to the press, a substantial body of legal opinion

has accumulated supporting a move to limit the amount of preverdict information available to the public. 5 However, the proper
balance between the concept of "fair trial," 6 requiring disinterested
jurors, and "free press," 7 requiring minimum censorship and maximum

access, has proved difficult to define. Although rumblings from the
"The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but
to see that justice is done. He should avoid oppression and injustice of any kind
whatsoever. The suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of establishing
the innocence of the accused is a public wrong.
3. Canon XX reads: "Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated
litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to the public, it is improfessional to
make it anonymously. An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation
from the records and papers on file in the Court; but even in extreme cases it is
better to avoid any ex partestatement."
4. State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964).
5. See generally THAmn, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS § 79 (1962); Pnal,s &
McCoy, CoNDucT OF JuDGES AND LwYERs 177-87 (1952) (includes a good bibliography which is still fairly current).
6. The constitutional right to a fair trial must be granted by state and federal courts
alike. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Colon v. Grieco, 226 F. Supp. 414
(D.N.Y. 1964); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 193 Pa. Super. 631, 165 A.2d 392 (1960).
Exactly what constitutes a fair trial under the federal constitution has never been
entirely settled. Not all the provisions of amendments five through eight are applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See discussion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), reaffirming Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937) and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Still some
federal requirements such as freedom from mob domination have been definitely
imposed on the states as requirements for fair trial. Moore v. Dempsey, supra. Thus
the states are free to work out their own method of criminal administration, but once
this has been done its functioning must conform to due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment. Ibid. Consequently, when a state constitution such as that
of New Jersey provides for a jury trial, the state must insure the fair administration
of that system. N.J. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
7. The first amendments prohibition against limiting free speech is applicable with
equal force to the states through the 14th amendment. See Citlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925). Also, each state constitution with the exception of those of
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Vermont and West Virginia guarantees
the right of free speech and provides that there shall be responsibility for its abuse.
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United States Supreme Court suggest less reluctance now than before
to reverse on due process grounds a conviction wrought from an
inflamed community,8 the Court has been unable to articulate a constitutional standard 9 whose application would define with adequate
precision the due process limits of pre-trial publicity. A second limiting tool is the use by state courts of "contempt by publication"' 0 to
control undesirable pre-verdict publicity. This tool, however, is dependent upon the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court, that
out-of-court publications can be punished summarily only when they
constitute a "clear and present danger" to an impartial judgment
of pending cases." In no case has the Court found "clear and
present" danger adequate to warrant punishment. 12 Thus, news media
representatives have acquired a virtual immunity3 from contempt
8. Compare Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950), with
Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (concurring opinion), and Rideau v. Louisiana
373 U.S. 723 (1963) (dissenting opinion). For an excellent annotation concerning
federal decisions involving criminal prosecutions and the concept of a fair trial in the
face of extensive pre-trial publicity, see 10 L. Ed. 2d 1242 (1963).
9. The probable position of the Court was stated by Justice Frankfurter as follows,
"This Court has not yet decided that the fair administration of criminal justice must
be subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional system-freedom of the
press, properly conceived. This Court has not yet decided that while convictions must
be reversed and miscarriages of justice result because the minds of jurors or potential
jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is constitutionally protected in plying his trade."
Irwin v. Dowd, supranote 8, at 730.
Ad hoc determinations are generally made in such cases. Most recently where "any
subsequent court proceeding in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle
[televised confession] could be but a hollow formality" the Court reversed. Rideau v.
Louisiana, supra note 8, at 726. See also Note, Constitutional Law: A Changing View
Toward Trial By Newspaper, 16 OxI.A. L. REv. 337 (1963).
10. This is the American analogue to the English system of punishing publishers of
unauthorized pre-verdict stories with the court's power of contempt. For a description
of the English system, see Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English
Law, 48 HARe.L. REV. 885 (1935). For a good historical description of the American
system see Forer, A Free Press and A Fair Trial, 39 A.B.A.J. 800 (1953).
11. A case may be "pending" from the time of the issuance of a warrant for arrest
(in a criminal case) or the filing of a complaint (in a civil case) until the final
disposition of a case on appeal. "The decisive consideration is whether the judge or
jury is or presently will be pondering a decision that comment seeks to affect."
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 369 (1946).
12. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, supra note 11.
13. The construction given "clear and present danger" in Craig suggests that state
courts would be entirely prevented from using their contempt power for this purpose.
See Craig v. Harney, supra note 12, at 391 (dissenting opinion).
Federal courts, except for misbehavior of its officers or disobedience to its lawful
command, can punish summarily only for "misbehavior of any person in its presence,
or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice . . ... 18 U.S.C. § 401
(1958) (Emphasis added). The italicized phrase was interpreted literally for some
70 years after passage of the original act. Then in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918), the phrase was given a causal rather than geographical
construction; that is, punishment was permitted for out-of-court comment whose effect
was felt in court. Finally in Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941), the Supreme
Court restored the literal (geographical) meaning of the phrase.
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prosecution for their reportorial zeal which might legally be limited
in other ways. Nonetheless, the attempted use of this power suggests
a need, felt by the judiciary, that some sanction be made available.
In addition to state and federal courts, both the legal and journalistic
professional associations have commented on the advisability of controlling the content of pre-verdict publicity. From the formulation of
the Canonsof ProfessionalEthics, including Canons Five and Twenty,
to the 1923 adoption by the American Society of Newspaper Editors
of the Canons of Journalism 4 and most recently to the New York5
County Lawyers Association Conference on Fair Trial-Free Press,'
the conclusion has been uniformally publicized that something should
be done voluntarily by the parties involved 16 to control the pernicious
effects of pre-verdict publicity. The question uniformally asked is
the following: "Cannot lawyers and journalists now develop a cooperative program together which will obviate the necessity for a
solution by legislative fiat or by judicial decree?" 17 To date no
workable, voluntary system has been put into effect.
In addition to the two methods of retrospective control already
mentioned,"' there are two systems of prospective control 9 which
seem more workable. Neither of these operates by requiring the mass
media to select for publication information already within its grasp.
Rather, both attempt to control by limiting the media's access to
crucial information. Thus, they differ only in their methods of limiting
access. By utilizing selective disclosure to the press, both systems
largely eliminate the criticism of vague standards justifiably leveled at
the retrospective controls. By virtue of their objective rules, these
methods relieve the would-be publisher from the burden of guessing
in advance what publications will or will not bring down the wrath
of the courts. Instead, these methods allow the media to publish
everything they acquire without fear of sanction. This method also
satisfies the aggressive nature of newsmen by obviating the necessity
for them to adopt a second, less aggressive set of behavioral standards
when dealing with a newsworthy lawsuit. In addition, the prospective
14. Conference, Fair Trial-FreePress, 10 BAR BULL. 170, 202 (1953).
15. Conference, supra note 14.
16. See generally Otterbourg, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Subiect Vital to the
Existence of Democracy, 39 A.B.A.J. 978 (1953).
17. Id. at 979.
18. Retrospective control is meant to include all systems which determine on an
ad hoc basis which disclosures were wrong after they have been made.
The two control methods already discussed and discarded because of the Supreme
Court's interpretation limiting their usefulness are: that which sanctions by reversing
convictions on due process grounds and that which has criminal sanctions meted out
through the court's contempt power.
19. Prospective control is meant to include those systems capable of defining a
violation with a degree of accuracy that will generally provide predictability prior
to the actual disclosure by the prospective violator.
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methods operate in the public interest not only by promoting a more
rational atmosphere in which to hold judicial proceedings, but by
funneling only accurate information to the public's media and eventually to the public. Thus, the public gains confidence and respect
for the judicial system as well as for the informational value of the
news media.20 Lastly, the system of controlling access to the news
by specific rules can more clearly define what is and what is not
within the limits of fairness for purposes of a trial. Were either the
due process or contempt method used the courts would have to
allow a certain latitude in publication which, in the interests of fairness in imposing sanctions, would probably allow information to have
been published that should not have been and that could have been
effectively screened out by a rule oriented system. Thus, a stronger
showing of unfairness, reflecting more substantial unfairness in fact,
would be necessary to justify sanctioning an indiscreet publication
under retrospective systems of control than would be necessary under
prospective systems. 2 '
One type of rule-oriented system was first instituted by District
Attorney Frank S. Hogan of New York County 22 and, most recently,
another more sophisticated version was adopted by United States Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach. 3 Each sets out in rule form
what can be said to the press by the legal or enforcement personnel
in the rule-maker's department. Characteristic of both systems are
those advantages inherent in any method of control which limits
disclosure rather than publication. Also, among the disclosure-limiting
methods, this type of system has an enforcement advantage unavailable to others by virtue of the fact that it is instituted by the organization that does the disclosing. Consequently, the threat of punishment
provides a more effective deterrent for indiscreet disclosures. Its major
20. Note, too, that such a system would mitigate the adversarial nature of the
relationship existing between the judiciary and press and could, thereby, foster mutual
respect and confidence.
21. As a corollary, note that judicial attitudes play considerably less part in a rulebased system than a contempt proceeding.
22. 12 BAn BuLL. 17 (1954). Hogan's rules so far as the writer can determine
merely prohibited the prosecution from commenting on what, if any, confessions were
obtained. Still they were criticized heavily in New York papers as being a "blackout"
and an "iron curtain of censorship." Id. at 17. Hogan defended his rules in a public
letter claiming that any other practice destroys the presumption of innocence theoretically present in every criminal case. Id. at 18. Indeed, sometimes alleged confessions
weren't even introduced at the trial. See Shephard v. Florida, 340 U.S. 890 (1950)
(conviction reversed).
23. Katzenbach, galvanized into action by the Warren Commission's Report on the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, formulated the following rules for use by
federal law enforcement agencies operating under Justice Department control-(1) the
Department will supply: (a) defendant's name, age, address, employment, marital status
and other general background information (b) the substance or text of the complaint,
indictment or information (c) identity of the investigative and arresting agency and
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draw-back is in not limiting the scope of comment allowed to the
defense attorneys. They can just as easily utilize the press unjustly
in the defendant's favor as the prosecution can to prejudice the
public against the accused. Considering all factors, however, such
methods constitute a step in the right direction by being more
definitive and providing more conveniently applied measures to control public consumption of pre-verdict criminal news.
The second new type of control mechanism that limits access of the
press to information is the one announced by the instant case. By
using the Canons of ProfessionalEthics as a vehicle for enforcement,
the system discourages defense counsel as well as prosecution attorneys from using the newspapers to try their case. But, as a corollary,
the vague threat of Bar Association censure is less threatening than
the more particular fear of censure created by a highly structured
employer's tribunal when the wrongdoer-employee violates a rule
laid down by that employer. Further, the system as proposed by the
instant case is relatively inflexible since it needs a decision from the
state's highest tribunal each time a change in the rules is required.
Also, since the state cannot appeal an acquittal, this inflexibility could
allow a loophole which would operate for the unjust benefit of the
accused by permitting defense counsel more latitude with the press
than is justified. It is submitted, however, that since these rules are
laid down as prospective rulings in dictum, a number of cases sufficiently relevant to justify review of the press-disclosure rules would
come before any supreme court in which new rules could be set forth.
To the extent that a court is able to review its rulings on the subject
at reasonable intervals and articulate new prospective rulings when
necessary, the system will avoid the evils of retrospectivity inherent in
both "due process" and "contempt" methods of control.2 4 Another
difficulty with the New Jersey system is that its practical effect on
police officers is dependent on the willingness of the police department to punish them for conduct unbecoming an officer as defined in
the instant case. To speculate on the departments propensity to
punish its own pursuant to rules established by an external body
the length of investigation preceding arrest (d) circumstances immediately surrounding
the arrest-time, place, resistance, pursuit, possession and use of weapons, and items
seized at time of arrest (e) photos if a "valid law enforcement function is thereby
served." It will not pose its prisoners for photographers nor will it prevent or discourage
picture taking. (2) the Department should be as circumspect as possible in the
disclosure of criminal records and as such will not volunteer any such information.
If asked it will only relate federal convictions and records. (3) No such confessionsor even that a fact that a confession has been made-should be provided by the
Justice Department." (4) the Department should not give out information on investigative procedures, e.g., ballistics, fingerprints, etc. New York Times, April 17, 1965,
p. 1, col. 3.
24. See notes 9 & 10 supra and accompanying text.
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would be fruitless, except to say that were the rule formally adopted
by the police department or originally articulated by it, this would be
less of a problem. Were the legislature to have formulated the rules
set out by the New Jersey court there would probably be no material
difference in their effect. In fact, having a court impose rules on
law enforcement agents and lawyers, both of whom are intimately
connected with the courts, seems particularly appropriate. In the last
analysis, although the New Jersey standard is as yet imprecise, it
does avoid the vagueness problems inherent in the older retrospective
methods while retaining the long-needed purifying effect of a news
control system.

Taxation-Corporate Income Taxation-Merger Results
In Loss of Non-Recognition Treatment for
Section 355 Spin-off
On January 30, 1957, American Crayon Company, an Ohio corporation, was merged into Joseph Dixon Crucible Company, a New
Jersey corporation. Both companies manufactured and sold school
and stationery supplies. On January 2, 1957, American had formed
a subsidiary corporation, Kroma, Inc., to assume an American-owned
warehouse rental operation unwanted by Dixon. In exchange for the
land and building, American took all of Kroma's stock which it then
distributed share for share to its own stockholders. Thereafter, Kroma
continued unchanged the rental operation of the American warehouse.
After the merger Dixon continued substantially unchanged the operation of the American manufacturing facility. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, determining that the Kroma stock distribution
constituted dividend income to American shareholders, assessed a
deficiency against Curtis, one of American's stockholders and a recipient of the Kroma stock. Paying under protest, Curtis brought suit
for refund' in the federal district court, contending that the transaction
was a non-taxable spin-off under section 355 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. Holding that American, having disappeared in the
merger, could not have been engaged in a trade or business immedi25. To date no legislature has attempted to formulate a code for use by the press
and lawyers.
1. A secondary issue, concerning the taxability of Dixon debt certificates received
by American shareholders pursuant to the merger agreement, will not be considered
in this comment.
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ately after the distribution of Kroma stock, the district court found

section 355(b) (1) (A) 2 of the Code unsatisfied, and thus denied refund. 3 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, held, affirmed on the same
grounds. Section 355's non-recognition of gain or loss arising from a
spin-off is an exception to the statute's general taxation of corporate
distributions as dividends; legislative history and judicial doctrine
warrant its strict construction. Curtis v. United States, 336 F.2d 714

(6th Cir. 1964).

4
The tax history of divisive reorganizations has been a turbulent one.
The Revenue Act of 1924 first provided non-recognition of gain or
loss arising from spin-offs if the spinning-off corporation, or its stockholders through distribution of the new corporation's stock as part
of the reorganization plan, controlled the spun-off corporation immediately after the transfer of property.5 The statute had no businesspurpose or continued-existence restrictions; literal compliance with
its terms could result in tax-free treatment for a transaction otherwise
endowed with all the charactistics of an ordinary dividend, i.e., the
withdrawal and economic realization of earnings and profits without
loss of control. In 1935, Gregory v. Helvering6 presented the Supreme
Court with precisely that problem. Liquid assets were transferred to
a newly-created corporation, the stock in which was distributed to
the sole shareholder of the transferring corporation. Immediately
thereafter the taxpayer liquidated the new corporation, received its
assets, converted them to cash, and then claimed capital gain treatment for the transaction. The court held that lack of business purpose
other than tax avoidance violated legislative intent, and allowed the
Commissioner's taxation of the transaction as a dividend. However,
an aroused Congress bad reacted quickly to the Board of Tax Appeals
decision, which had been in favor of the taxpayer, by eliminating7 the

2. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 355(b) (1): "Subsection (a) [conferring non-recognition of gain or loss] shall apply only if . . . (A) the distributing corporation, and
the controlled corporation . . . is engaged immediately after the distribution in the
active conduct of a trade or business...
3. Curtis v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
4. Three types have been favored, from time to time, with non-recognition provisions
in the federal tax laws. These are: (1) spin-off-one corporation distributes to some
or all of its shareholders the stock of a subsidiary corporation; (2) split-off-the shareholders of the parent surrender part of their stock in the parent for shares in the
subsidiary; and (3) split-up-the parent corporation liquidates, distributing its stock
in two or more subsidiaries. Prior to the 1954 Code, these types of reorganization
were accorded diverse tax treatment. A concise summary of historical provisions may
be found in BrrrER, FEDEa.

INcoME TAxAmox OF CoapolAnoNs

AND SARE-

321-28 (1959, Supp. 1964).
5. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 203(c), 43 Stat. 256.
6. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
7. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 112, 48 Stat. 704. See also H.R. REP. No. 704,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
HOLDERS
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provision in its entirety, thus leaving all spin-offs taxable as dividends.
In 1951 repeated legislative efforts to reinstate the tax-free spin-off
resulted in Congress's addition of section 112(b) (11) to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939.8 The new section's language incorporated
the continued-existence restriction as a safeguard to complement the
Gregory doctrine. Finally, the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, here
under judicial construction, provides more numerous restrictions and
applies them alike to spin-offs, split-offs, and split-ups. In brief, before
bestowing tax-free treatment the Code requires the following conditions to be satisfied: (1) the transaction must not be used principally
to distribute earnings and profits; 9 (2) the distributing corporation
must have 80 per cent control of the corporation whose shares are
being distributed; 10 (3) enough shares to constitute 80 per cent
control must be distributed;" (4) the two corporations must each have
a separate trade or business that has actively been conducted over
the five years preceding distribution; 12 and (5) each corporation must
immediately after the distribution be engaged in the active conduct
of a trade or business. 13 Though one of original impression for the
judiciary, the question of whether under the 1954 Code spin-off of
an unwanted business prior to merger should be accorded tax-free
status has confronted the Treasury Department several times. Its
position has consistently been that a pre-arranged disposition of the
stock in either corporation is evidence that the spin-off transaction
is a device for the distribution of earnings and profits. 14 Even though
tax-free, a prearranged exchange of stock pursuant to merger plans
has been ruled by the Treasury to be fatal to the tax-free status of a
spin-off. 15
In the instant case, the Sixth Circuit set forth the statutory definition
of dividend, section 355's exemption therefrom, and the Senate
Finance Committee's report on the 1951 amendment reinstating taxfree treatment of spin-offs. The court emphasized that the legislature
intended both corporations, the parent as well as the subsidiary, to
continue in business after the spin-off. It then reasoned that the
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(b)(11), added by ch. 521, § 317, 65 Stat. 493
(1951).
9. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a)(1) (B).
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a) (1) (A).
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a)(1) (D).
12. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 355(b) (2).
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355(b) (1).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-2(b) (1) (1955): "If, pursuant to an arrangement negotiated
or agreed upon prior to the distribution of stock . . . . stock or securities of either
corporation are sold or exchanged after the distribution, such sale or exchange will
be evidence that the transaction was used principally as a device ....
15. Rev. Rul. 58-68, 1958-1 Cum. BuLL. 183. See also Rev. Rul. 55-103, 1955-1
Cum. BULL. 31, where spin-off of an unwanted business prior to the shareholders' outright sale of a corporation was ruled to be a "device."
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parent, American, lost both its corporate identity and its corporate
existence by merging; therefore, it was no longer engaged in
the active conduct of a trade or business because it was no longer
in being at all. The taxpayer pointed out that Dixon conducted
American's business after the merger with the same assets as had
American before the merger. But the court treated as farfetched the
taxpayer's contention that this should fulfill the continued-existence
requirement; although the business was continued, the legislative
16
requirement that the parent corporation continue it was not met.
There were available two alternative approaches that the court
might have taken. The one it chose is the more literal and technical
of the two. Yet, undoubtedly, there is ample basis for it in the
language of the Code, especially under the judicial notion of construing exceptions strictly. The court's holding does present this intriguing
speculation, however: had Dixon been merged into American, rather
than American into Dixon, a transaction with the same economic
effect on the business and on the shareholders, would the test of
section 355(b) have been met? Certainly the distributing corporation, albeit expanded in size of business and number of stockholders,
is continuing the active conduct of a trade or business in its own
name. On the other hand, does a merger so change the character of
the surviving corporation that, regardless of its name, it cannot be
said to be the same corporation that originally spun-off the unwanted
business? To pose these questions is to recognize the second approach
available to the court: It might have considered the substance of the
transaction rather than the form, and therefore considered whether
Congress intended to exempt some merger-spin-off transactions from
recognition of gain while not so exempting others of identical economic character. It might have undertaken the following analysis.
In the eyes of state corporation law, constituent corporations, by
merging, become one corporate entity possessed of the rights and
duties of its predecessors. 17 Thus, there is a continuing corporation
in both legal and economic reality sufficient to satisfy section 355(b).
Congress seeks not to impede corporate reorganization by imposing tax
barriers where the reorganization is designed to fulfill a legitimate
business purpose.' 8 This attitude underlies all the Code provisions 19
16. Curtis v. United States, supra note 3, at 719.
17. LATTiN, CORPORATIONS 537 (1959). The statutory provision in the instant case
is found in Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.81(A)(2),(4) (Baldwin 1955).
18. The Senate Finance Committee Report relied on in part by the court in the
instant case reemphasizes congressional policy: "Yj our committee believes that it is
economically unsound to impede spin-offs which break up businesses into a greater
number of enterprises, when undertaken for legitimate business purposes." S. REa.
No. 781, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1951).
19. For the various reorganizations accorded special tax treatment see INT. REv.
CoDE OF 1954, § 368.
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for non-recognition of gain or loss in cases of corporate reorganization.
Thus,20 where merger, or other sheltered reorganization, e.g., consolidation, is the reason for spin-off, the distributing corporation will necessarily undergo a change of form-but a change of form not to be
directly impeded by tax barriers. It would not be wise, therefore, to
impede the change indirectly by taxing an otherwise non-taxable spinoff. But is the Kroma spin-off otherwise non-taxable? The control requirements and the separate business requirements of section 355
are met.21 However, section 355(a) (1) (B) poses another problem
similar to the one already considered. That section reads:
the transaction [must not have been] used principally as a device for
the distribution of the earnings and profits of the distributing corporation
or the controlled corporation or both (but the mere fact that subsequent to
the distribution stock or securities in one or more of such corporations are
sold or exchanged by all or some of the distributees (other than pursuant to
an arrangement negotiated or agreed upon prior to such distribution) shall
not be construed to mean that the transaction was used principally as such

a device). [Emphasis added.]

Apparently a pre-arranged sale or exchange of the distributing corporation's stock by the distributees is to be construed as a "device."
Whether the exchange is to be construed conclusively, or merely as a
presumption, the statute leaves unsaid.22 American's shareholders, the
Kroma distributees, did exchange American's stock for Dixon's pursuant to a pre-arranged plan, although the exchange was one favored
by congressional economic policy. Once again, however, it may be
observed that had Dixon been merged into American, rather than
American into Dixon, the problem would not have arisen. Dixon
shareholders, not parties to the spin-off transaction, would have
exchanged their Dixon shares for American shares, while the American
shareholders, the Kroma distributees, could have retained their original holdings intact. Thus the exchange that actually took place
should not be construed conclusively to be a "device." Rather, the
question is whether the spin-off transaction resulted in a bail-out of
earnings and profits. Was there actual withdrawal and economic
realization of earnings and profits without loss of control, or was
there a mere continuation of the business under modified corporate
20. Consolidation, i.e., two corporations combining to form a third and new
corporation, is here mentioned because, under the court's reasoning in the instant case,
the consolidating corporations would cease to exist, thus rendering pre-consolidation
spin-offs taxable.
21. The distributing corporation, American, owned 100% of the subsidiary's stock and
distributed it all.
22. The Treasury position that the exchange is merely evidence has been previously
mentioned. See note 14 supra.
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form? If the latter, the spin-off should be granted non-recognition of
gain under section 355.
The foregoing analysis indicates the problems arising under section
355. To claim its benefit, corporations must avoid wrong-way merger
or consolidation if there is an unwanted business to be divided off
from one of the parties to the combinational reorganization. If the
judicial doctrine of strict construction of exceptions to general taxation
statutes is not to be severely stretched, as the court in the instant
case was unwilling to do, and if congressional encouragement of
reorganization pursuant to legitimate business ends is to be effective,
the statute should be amended so as to prevent the uneven treatment
here illustrated. In the instant case, the transaction apparently involved no bail-out of earnings and profits, and yet it was taxed as if
it did. It is not inconceivable that recipients of stock in a spun-off
corporation would have to liquidate the spun-off business, probably
at a loss in the absence of a ready buyer, in order to pay their taxes
on the "dividend." Thus the economic continuity sought by Congress
is disrupted, possible hardship imposed, and flexibility of business form
denied.

Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Election of
Installment Basis of Reporting Gain
Through an Amended Return
Petitioners, husband and wife, owned a thirty-five acre tract of land
on which they lived and operated an airport and relay facilities. In
1958, petitioners sold the tract to a church for 181,600 dollars, payable
1000 dollars down and the balance in monthly annual installments.
Petitioners received 2600 dollars in 1958 from this sale and mistakenly'
reported this amount as gross business income on their 1958 joint
return. The actual sale was not reported in this return2 and upon
audit of petitioners' 1958 return and examination of petitioners' books,
the Commissioner determined that petitioners had realized from the
1. The 1958 return was filed by Opal Reaver due to the illness of her husband at
that time. Her husband had consulted a certified public accountant at the time of
the sale and had been advised to report profits from the transaction on the installment
basis. Opal, however, bad no knowledge of this conversation and was ignorant of
the installment provision of § 453(b) of the Code. The $2600 received from the
sale in 1958 was merely recorded as receipts of the airport operation, designated as
being received from the church, and was included in the summary of gross receipts
from the airport operations.
2. See note 1 supra.
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sale a capital gain of 79,499.37 dollars in 1958 and, accordingly,
assessed a deficiency against them. Petitioners then filed an amended
return in which they specifically reported the sale of the thirty-five
acre tract as a capital transaction, computed the gross profit thereon,
and elected to account for the gain on the installment basis under
section 453(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 3 Upon the
Commissioner's refusal to allow petitioners' election of the installment
basis, appeal was taken to the Tax Court of the United States. Held,
reversed. When the taxpayer, through honest mistake or omission, has
failed to elect the installment basis of reporting gain from the sale of
land in the year of sale and has made no other election, he may,
through an amended return, elect the installment basis of reporting the
gain. John P. Reaver, 42 T.C. 72 (1964).
Section 453(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that
an individual who sells real property may elect to report as income in
any taxable year that proportion of the installment payments actually
received in that year which the gross profit, realized or to be realized
when the payment is completed, bears to the contract price.4 Neither
the Code nor the regulations specifically provide when or in what
form the election must be made. 5 It is generally established that once
a taxpayer has made an election, he must stand by it;6 however, the
difficult problem is to determine what action by the taxpayer constitutes a binding election. For instance, if a taxpayer realizes income
which qualifies for the installment basis treatment and he files a
return in which he fails to make a positive election of the installment
basis, either by mistakenly characterizing such income or by failing
to report it altogether, has he made a binding election? Earlier Tax
Court cases have held that a taxpayer was bound by his failure to
take positive action, upholding the Commissioner's position that a
taxpayer who failed to report profits on the installment basis on a
timely filed return for the year of the sale forfeited his rights to elect
the installment basis.7 More recently the Tax Court has not adhered
to the Commissioner's view and has ruled that a taxpayer may elect
the installment basis later than the year of the sale when there
was a good faith mistake or omission and the taxpayer had not
3. Under this section a taxpayer who sells or otherwise disposes of real property
may return as income in any taxable year that proportion of the installment payments
actually received in the year in which the gross profit, realized or to be realized when
the payment is completed, bears to the total contract price. INT. REy. CODE OF 1954,
§ 453(b) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 44(b)).
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453(b) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 44(b)).
5. Treas. Regs. § 1.453-8(b) (1) (1958).
6. Pacific Natl Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191 (1938); Jacobs v. Commissioner, 224
F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1955), affirming 21 T.C. 165 (1953).
7. W. A. Ireland, 32 T.C. 994 (1959); Cedar Valley Distillery, Inc., 16 T.C. 870
(1951); W. T. Thrift, Sr., 15 T.C. 366 (1950); Sarah Briarly, 29 B.T.A. 2,56 (1933).
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previously made a positive election to report on another basis.8 Two
circuit courts have considered the question and neither has approved
the Commissioner's rule.9 The most recent of these cases, Baca -v.
Commissioner,0 further extended the Tax Court's "good faith" rule."
In Baca the taxpayer had realized income from the sale of property in
1953 and had failed to report it until 1957, at which time she elected
the installment basis. The Commissioner found the taxpayer negligent
in delaying to file a return and refused to allow the election. The Tax
Court affirmed, 12 noting that "where benefits are sought by taxpayers,
meticulous compliance with all named conditions is required." 3 The
court further noted that it could hardly be said that there was any
"non-negligent good faith omission.. ."1 by the taxpayer, apparently
attempting to distinguish the Baca case from Hornberger v. Commissioner,5 decided by the Fifth Circuit. The court of appeals reversed, 16 pointing out that the-penalty which results from denying a
negligent taxpayer the right to elect the installment basis was beyond
the statutory power of the Commissioner.' 7 The prevailing case law
thus indicates that where a taxpayer has either mistakenly characterized or failed to report installment income in the year of the sale, he
has not made an election, and even if negligent in his omission he is
not precluded from subsequently electing the installment basis in an
amended return.
The rationale of the instant case is consistent with that of recent Tax
Court decisions construing section 453(b),18 as well as with the reasoning expounded in the decisions of the courts of appeal.19 Observing
that neither the Code nor the regulations contain specific reporting
requirements which must be met by the taxpayer in order to enjoy
the benefits of section 453(b), the court further noted that there is
nothing in the legislative history of this section which indicates that
8. Nathan C. Spivey, 40 T.C. 1051 (1963); Jack Farber, 36 T.C. 1142, aff'd, 312
F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 (1963); John F. Bayley, 35 T.C. 288
(1960).
9. Baca v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.), reversing 38 T.C. 609 (1962);
Homberger v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1961); Scales v. Commissioner,
211 F.2d 133 (6th Cir.), reversing 18 T.C. 1263 (1952); United States v. Eversman,
133 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1943).
10. 326 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1964).
11. See authorities cited note 8 supra. The Tax Court's emphasis on the taxpayer's
good faith is implicit in the language used in these cases. The court stated more
specifically that it felt good faith was required in Baca v. Commissioner, supra note 9.
12. 38 T.C. 609.
13. Id. at 613.
14. Id. at 615.
15. 289 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1961).
16. Baca v. Commissioner, supranote 9.
17. Id. at 191.
18. See authorities cited note 8 supra.
19. See authorities cited note 9 supra.
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the taxpayer may not elect the installment basis on an amended
return. 20 The court stated that the Secretary of the Treasury could
easily provide in his regulations that the election must be made on
a timely filed return. The court also took cognizance of the fact
that the regulations governing election of the installment basis by
dealers in personal property were amended in 1963 so as to require that
the dealer elect in a timely filed return.21 While admitting that there
may be more reason for the specific requirement in the case of dealers,
the court felt that omission of a similar requirement for section 453(b)
could hardly be due to the Secretary's oversight. 22 The court did not
think that the taxpayers, by reporting as gross business income in
1958 all of the income derived from the sale in that year, had made
an election between reporting the gain all in one year and reporting
on the installment basis.23 Having made no conscious election, the
rule of the Pacific National case,24 that once a taxpayer makes an election he is bound thereby, was inapplicable. Thus, the taxpayers were
not precluded from electing the installment method on an amended
return2 The taxpayers had not adopted any position inconsistent with
the installment basis, they had reported the entire proceeds from the
sale actually received in 1958, and they bad included all of the
information required by the regulations governing section 453(b) in
their amended return. Hence, said the court, the taxpayers merely
made an honest mistake, and having rectified it at the earliest opportunity, there was no valid reason for denying them the 26privilege of
electing the installment basis on their amended return.
The decision in the instant case follows the current trend of
decisions and, equally important, is demonstrative of equitable tax
law administration. From the jurisprudential viewpoint, procedural
tax rules are not desirable when they result in unfairness to the
taxpayer. So long as a taxpayer is reporting income honestly, it
would seem to make little difference whether the income is reported
on an original return or, because of the taxpayer's mistake or omission,
it must be reported on an amended return. The burden should,
however, be on the taxpayer to show his good faith. Sound tax
administration is intended to be a fair implementation of congressional
tax policy. Congress, having made no specific statutory provision for
a timely election under section 453(b), has delegated to the Treasury
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

42 T.C. at 79-80.
Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 81.
Ibid.
Pacific Nat'l Co. v. Welch, supra note 6.
42 T.C. at 81.
Id. at 82.
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Department the duty of promulgating such a requirement if the
Department deems it necessary from the standpoint of sound tax
administration. It seems obvious that if the efficient administration
of the provisions of the section were hampered by a taxpayer's
being permitted to elect on an amended return, the Treasury, through
its regulations, could easily require that the election be made on a
timely filed return.
So long as the taxpayer's installment basis election via an amended
return does not result in inconvenience to the government, it seems
imprudent for the Commissioner to impose upon the taxpayer a
requirement which he could easily have spelled out but has failed to
do so. If the taxpayer has made no positive election of another basis
of reporting his income, and his failure to elect the installment basis
is not based on negligence, permitting him to elect the installment
basis on an amended return grants him no more than that to which
he is entitled under the statute.

Taxation-Federal Income Tax-Section 212(3)
Extended to Attorney's Fees Arising Out of
Divorce Settlement
The plaintiff taxpayer paid attorney's fees in excess of 10,000 dollars
arising out of an uncontested divorce and separation from his former
wife. Evidence established that at least seventy percent of the bill
represented the fee properly allocable to services and advice directed
to minimizing possible tax consequences to the plaintiff flowing from
the divorce and separation settlement.' Plaintiff contended that the
portion of his attorney's fees pertaining solely to services and advice
regarding tax matters was an allowable deduction from his gross
income under section 212(3) as "ordinary and necessary expenses
paid ... in connection with the determination, collection, or refund
of any tax."2 The Government opposed the deduction, contending
1. The attorney concentrated on making certain that the support payments to be
made would be alimony taxable to the wife and hence deductible by plaintiff. INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954,,§ 71(a), provides that alifnony payments made under specified
conditions are to beincluded in the wife's gross income, whereas, § 215(a) provides
that the husband is 'allowed a deduction for amounts which are includible under §
71 in the-gross incomeof his wife. INwr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 71(a), 215(a).
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(3). The section in full provides: "In the case
of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-(l)' for the-production or collection
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that section 212(3) is limited to tax controversies, thus not encompassing plaintiff's uncontested divorce settlement. The Court of
Claims held, an individual taxpayer is entitled to deduct as legal
expenses under section 212(3) the portion of his attorney's fees
allocable to tax counseling arising out of a divorce and separation.
Thus, deduction for fees of tax counsel is not restricted to fees incurred in connection with contested tax controversies. Carpenter v.
United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
Section 212(3) was first introduced in the 1954 Code. Previously,
the Internal Revenue Code permitted individuals to deduct non-trade
or business expenses incurred "for the production or collection of
income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of
property held for the production of income." 3 In 1952, the Supreme
Court handed down a decision which prompted the inclusion of
section 212(3). In Lykes v. United States,4 the Court held that legal
fees paid in connection with litigation of gift tax liability, unlike a
contest over the income tax or estate tax, did not fall within either
of the sections quoted above. Section 212(3) of the 1954 Code was
designed to change the rule in the Lykes case,- so that an individual
could deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses paid in connection
with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax. 6 The Commissioners and the courts began allowing deductions for attorney's
fees, but only in actual controversies involving tax liability or for
tax advice in the preparation of returns. 7 Davis v. United States8
changed this. In Davis, the Court of Claims held, on facts substantially identical to those in the present case, that "fees paid by plaintiff
for consultation and advice in tax matters arising in connection with
of income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held
for the production of income; or (3) in connection with the determination, collection,
or refund of any tax." Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212.

3. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 23(a) (2), 56 Stat. 819. This is substantially the
same as Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(1)-(2).
4. 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
5. Committee reports support this conclusion. "Existing law allows an individual to
deduct expenses connected with earning income or managing and maintaining incomeproducing property. Under the regulations costs incurred in connection with contests
over certain tax liabilities, such as income and estate taxes, have been allowed, but these
costs have been disallowed where the contest involved gift-tax liability. A new provision
added by your committee allows a deduction for expenses connected with determination,
collection, or refund of any tax liability." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
29 (1954).
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(3). "Paragraph (3) is new and is designed to
permit the deduction by an individual of legal and other expenses paid or incurred
in connection with a contested tax liability, whether the contest be Federal, State, or
municipal taxes, or whether the tax be income estate, gift, property, and so forth."
Supra note 5.
7. See 42 B.U.L. Rm,. 547 (1962).
8. 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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a settlement agreement are properly deductible from gross income"9
under section 212(3). On certiorari, the Government did not contest
the taxpayer's deduction of his own attorney's fees in the settlement,
and the Supreme Court refrained from commenting on the question.' 0
In the present case, the Government contended that a deduction
for fees of tax counsel under section 212(3) is restricted to proceedings involving tax controversies. The taxpayer and the court felt that
section 212(3) was not so limited. The Government cited reports
of House and Senate committees which made frequent use of the
term, "contested tax liability," in reference to section 212(3)." The
court, however, applied the "plain meaning rule" to section 212(3)
and the regulations in reaching its conclusion. Section 212(3) allows
a deduction for legal expenses "in connection with the determination,
collection, or refund of any tax." 2 The court stated that, "this language is clearly not limited in meaning to any contested tax controversy, as construed by defendant."13 In referring to the Treasury
Regulations, which provide that "expenses paid or incurred by a
taxpayer for tax counsel .. . are deductible," 14 the court stated, "the
language of the . . .regulation . . . is sufficiently clear by itself to
allow the deduction sought here."15 The court also cited Davis as
controlling in this case.' 6 The court pointed out that the taxpayer
should not be restricted to the deduction of expenses for tax counsel
which are incurred solely for the purpose of discovering the tax
consequences of past transactions or contesting tax liabilities already
accrued. By obtaining the services of tax counsel the taxpayer seeks
to avoid tax contests, not to create them, and in this he serves both
his own interest and that of the government.
If the instant case is followed by other courts, the question arises
as to how far the decision will be extended. Three stages of tax
counseling should be considered when construing section 212(3):
9. Id. at 171.
10. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
11. See note 5 supra and the authority cited therein. Accordingly, any expenses
incurred in contesting any liability collected as a tax or as part of a tax will be
deductible. Ibid.
12. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212(3).
13. 338 F.2d at 369.
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(2) (1) (1957). The paragraph in full provides: "Expenses
paid or incurred by an individual in connection with the determination, collection, or
refund of any tax, whether the taxing authority be Federal, State, or municipal, and
whether the tax be income, estate, gift, property, or any other tax, are deductible.
Thus, expenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer for tax counsel or expenses paid or
incurred in connection with the preparation of his tax returns or in connection with
any proceedings involved in determining the extent of tax liability or in contestng
his tax liability are deductible."
15. 338 F.2d at 368.
16. Ibid.
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(1) tax counseling which takes place after the occurrence of the
transactions or events, (2) tax counseling which contemplates immediate and certain occurrence of the event, and (3) tax counseling
where the taxable events are uncertain and in futuro. The dissent
would limit application of section 212(3) to the first stage, thus
authorizing a deduction only for tax counsel employed in connection
with the preparation or consideration of tax returns or with tax
proceedings since these are based on past or settled events. 17 Since
the plaintiff employed tax counsel before the events had been
settled, i.e., before the divorce, separation, and alimony decree, the
dissent maintained that a 212(3) deduction was not allowable. The
majority adopted a broader meaning, but the question becomes how
much broader. If limited to a strict interpretation upon its own facts,
the result would be that an individual taxpayer is entitled to deduct
as legal expenses under section 212(3) that portion of his attorney's
fees allocable to tax counseling in divorce and separation settlements.
If, on the other hand, the court's reasoning is broadly interpreted, the
decision will have significant and far-reaching implications in a most
important area of tax law. It may be argued that the court intended
that expenses incurred by a taxpayer for tax counsel are deductible
under any situation, thereby encompassing all three stages mentioned
above. This would encompass all planning which includes an effort
to miminize federal income, estate, or gift taxes, as well as state and
local taxes. Therefore, expenses incurred in all general tax planning
of holdings, estates, and marital and family obligations which were
heretofore barred from deduction under section 262 as personal living
expenses, 8 would be deductible. However, a limiting factor is indicated in the court's opinion. The court pointed out that plaintiff
employed tax counsel to minimize two tax consequences to plaintiff arising out of the property settlement attendant to the divorce.
These tax consequences concerned the tax year when the divorce
settlement was concluded, and plaintiff's future annual payments to
his wife as alimony. The court stated, "these tax consequences were
the result of the same transaction, which had to be considered in
toto in 1957 when plaintiff employed tax counsel." 19 Thus, it may be
17. "I interpret it, however, not as authorizing the deduction of expenses paid for
any tax counsel, but only for tax counsel employed in connection with the preparation
or consideration of tax returns or with tax proceedings, i.e., tax advice given after the
critical events have taken place or been settled. Tax counsel designed to help plan
future transactions or arrangements is not covered." Supra note 13, at 371 (dissenting
opinion).
18. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262. "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses." See
United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
19. 338 F.2d at 370.
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argued that -the court's reasoning encompasses the first and second
stages only; that is, tax counseling concerning past or settled events,
and tax counseling which contemplates the immediate and certain
occurrence of future events. It is apparent that allocation will become
the key to successful use of a deduction under 212(3). If the tax
counseling contemplates immediate and certain occurrence of the
event, and if the event does in fact occur, the taxpayer, upon
receiving a bill from an attorney, should simply allocate the fee
pertaining to services and advice on tax matters and include this in
his income tax deductions. So long as the allocation is reasonable
under the circumstances and made in good faith, the taxpayer's
determination should withstand attack.

Torts-Compensation and Liability Insurer's Liability
for Negligent Performance of Voluntary Inspections
Actions for wrongful death and personal injuries suffered when a
construction hoist fell with the plaintiffs and plaintiffs' decedents
aboard were consolidated for trial in Illinois Superior Court, Cook
County.1 American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, the compensation and liability insurer for the general contractor who owned
and operated the defective hoist, was joined as defendant in the suit
on the ground that it was negligent in its voluntary inspections of
the hoist.2 The court ruled that the insurer's voluntary inspections of
the hoist had given rise to a duty to use reasonable care to discover
defects, and the jury found that breach of this duty proximately
caused plaintiffs' injuries. 3 The appellate court reversed, 4 holding that
liability for a voluntary undertaking is imposed only when active
negligence is shown,5 and further, that no liability could be imposed
1. Dieringer, Henry W., J. (no opinion published). The accident occurred in Duval
County, Florida.
2. The general contractor was immune from tort liability under Florida's Workmen's
Compensation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 440.01-.57 (Supp. 1964). American was sued
as third party tortfeasor. The plaintiffs were employees of the general contractor and
of various subcontractors. Their right of action against a third party tortfeasor is
preserved by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39(1) (Supp. 1964).
3. Judgments against the insurer totaled $1,569,400. Judgments were entered in the
trial court for the other two defendants, the designer and manufacturer of the safety
device on the hoist, and the manufacturer of the cable which broke. These judgments
were affrmed on appeal.
4. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 39 I1. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963).
5. Id. at 122, 187 N.E.2d at 447. The appellate court treated plaintiff's cause of
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unless it was shown that either the injured parties or the general
contractor relied upon the insurer's voluntary inspections.6 The Illinois
Supreme Court, three justices dissenting, held, reversed. A compensation and liability insurer who undertakes voluntary inspections of
property of the insured and fails to use reasonable care to discover
defects in such property is liable for injuries to any persons it could
reasonably have foreseen might be injured as a result of its negligent
inspections, regardless of any reliance upon the insurer's inspections.7
Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769 (II. 1964).
That liability can arise from negligent performance of a voluntary
undertaking is well established.8 This principle is typically applied
in those cases in which a truck driver fails to use reasonable care in
signaling the car behind to pass,9 or in which a party voluntarily
undertakes to protect certain persons, 10 or to aid an injured person,"
and fails to use reasonable care. One eminent authority indicates that
in most cases imposing liability for negligent performance of a
voluntary undertaking, the defendant has in some way worsened the
situation, either by increasing the danger or by subjecting the plaintiff
to a present danger by causing him to rely on the defendant's negligent
acts or misrepresentations. 12 In at least one line of cases, however,
more than just a duty to refrain from making the situation worse was
imposed: landlords have been held liable for not using care in volunaction against the insurer as solely for nonfeasance. It apparently meant by "active
negligence" acts which worsen the situation as distinct from mere failure to use care
to discover defects.
6. Id. at 125, 187 N.E.2d at 453.
7. The court's statement that reliance upon the inspections was not essential for the
insurer's liability can, however, be construed as mere dictum, in view of the court's
tentative recognition that, even if reliance was required, there was adequate evidence
of it in this case. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 199 N.E.2d 769, 780 (111. 1964).
Mr. Chief Justice Klingbiel's lengthy opinion in this case dealt with two other
issues, both of which involved construction of the Florida Workmen's Compensation
Act: (1) whether the insurer could claim the immunity that the act granted the
general contractor, and (2) whether it could claim immunity on the ground that it
was a subcontractor. The court answered these two questions in the negative. They
are not dealt with in this comment.
8. See, e.g., notes 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 17 infra and the cases cited therein. See also
38 Ams. Jur. Negligence § 17 (1941); 86 C.J.S. Torts § 6 n.46 (1954) and accompanying text; Pnossmn, ToRTs § 54, at 339-43 (3d ed. 1964); RE STATmENT, TonTs
§§ 323, 325 (1934).
0. Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Carter, 233 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1956); Haralson v.
Jones Truck Lines, 233 Ark. 813, 270 S.W.2d 892 (1954); Thelen v. Spilman, 251
Minn. 89, 86 N.W.2d 700 (1957).
10. Perrone v. Pennsylvania R.R., 136 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1943); Conowingo Power
v. Maryland, 120 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1941); Will v. Southern Pac. Co., 18 Cal. 2d
468, 116 P.2d 44 (1941).
11. Slater v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 209 Fed. 480 (M.D. Tenn. 1911); Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R.R. v. Leflar, 168 Miss. 255, 150 So. 220 (1933); Bascho v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 3 N.J. Super. 86, 65 A.2d 613 (1949).
12. PuossER, op. cit. supra note 8, § 54, at 342.
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tarily making repairs for their tenants, even though the landlord's acts

did not increase the danger and the plaintiff did not rely upon the

landlord's acts. 13 In spite of the many cases in the field of tort liability

for voluntary undertakings, the question of just when a duty of care

arises and of what it consists have never been adequately defined.' 4
The instant case is the most recent in a long line of decisions

holding insurers who undertake voluntary inspections and fail to
use reasonable care to discover defects liable for injuries arising from

these defects. The leading case is Van Winkle v. American Steam
Boiler Co.,'5 in which an insurer was held liable for injuries resulting

from a boiler explosion on the ground that the insurer's repeated
voluntary inspections of the boiler and its participation in the boiler's
maintenance gave rise to a duty to use reasonable care to discover the
defects which led to the explosion. 16 While numerous cases i 7 have

reached similar results, another line of decisions 8 has refrained from

imposing such liability on the ground that no duty to use reasonable

care to discover defects arose out of the insurer's voluntary, limited
inspections. These two lines of cases should be read in the light of
the common law rule which imposes upon employers a duty to provide
reasonably safe working conditions for their employees. 19 This duty
extends to employees of independent contractors working on the
13. Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S.W.2d 849 (1943); Freddi-Gail Inc. v.
Royal Holding Corp., 45 N.J. Super. 471, 133 A.2d 362 (1957); Conner v. Farmers &
Merchants Bank, 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963).
14. The American Law Institute has attempted to define the duty owed by a voluntary
actor in the following sections: "(1) One who gratuitously renders services to
another, otherwise than by taking charge of him when helpless, is subject to liability
for bodily harm caused to the other by his failure, while so doing, to exercise with
reasonable care such competence and skill as he possesses or leads the other reasonably

to believe that he possesses .

R..ESTAITmmNT, TORTS

§ 323 (1934).

"One who gratuitously undertakes with another to do an act or to render services
which he should recognize as necessary to the other's bodily safety and thereby leads
the other in reasonable reliance upon the performance of such undertaking (a) to
refrain from himself taking the necessary steps to secure his safety or from securing
the then available protective action by third persons . . . is subject to liability to
the other for bodily harm resulting from the actor's failure to exercise reasonable care
to carry out his undertaking." RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 325 (1934).
15. 52 N.J.L. 240, 19 Atl. 472 (1890).
16. Id. at 245-47, 19 Ad. at 474-75.
17. See, e.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 201
Fed. 617 (7th Cir. 1912); Smith v. Employers' Ins. Co., 102 N.H. 530, 163 A.2d 564
(1960); Bollin v. Elevator Constr. & Repair Co., 361 Pa. 7, 63 A.2d 19 (1949); Sheridan
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 3 Wash. 2d 423, 100 P.2d 1024 (1940).
18. Zamecki v. Hardford Ace. & Indem. Co., 202 Md. 54, 95 A.2d 302 (1953);
Viducich v. Greater New York Mut. Ins. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 15, 192 A.2d 596 (1963);
See also Ulwelling v. Crown Coach Corp., 206 Cal. App. 2d 96, 23 Cal. Rptr. 631
(1962).
19. McBeath v. Rawle, 192 Ill. 626, 61 N.E. 847 (1901) (employer held liable for
injuries resulting from faulty scaffolding).
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21
premises; 20 it includes the affirmative duty of reasonable inspections,
and there is no indication that workmen's compensation acts were
in any way intended to abrogate this duty.22 A comparison of the
two lines of insurer inspection cases indicates that, in the cases following Van Winkle, the insurer had openly undertaken such extensive
inspections as would reasonably have indicated to the insured employer the insurer's intention to undertake primary inspection duties;
in the cases which refused to impose liability on the insurer, the
insurer's inspections were so limited in scope as to indicate that the
duty to inspect for hazardous defects remained solely with the
insured employer, and that such a duty had not been undertaken by
the insurer.23
In holding the insurer in the instant case liable for plaintiffs' injuries,
the Illinois Supreme Court relied upon: (1) the line of insurer inspection cases following Van Winkle, 24 and (2) a literal application of the
rule announced in section 323 of the Restatement.25 The court thereby
arrived at the unique rule that an insurer will be liable for its negligent failure to discover hazards in the course of its voluntary and
limited inspections, regardless of whether there was reliance on such
inspections.26 Applying section 323 of the Restatement, which imposes
upon the voluntary actor the duty to use reasonable care to exercise
the skill which he possesses, the court apparently reasoned that
since reliance is not expressly required for liability under this section,
such a requirement should not be read into it.2 7 Similarly, since the
insurer inspection cases cited by the court did not expressly mention
the element of reliance, the majority of the court interpreted these
cases as upholding its decision. 28 The majority also emphasized that in
the instant case a safety engineer employed by the insurer had made
periodic inspections of the construction site for more than a year prior
to the accident; that results of the inspections were reported to the
insured general contractor with specific recommendations for safety
improvements and that failure to comply with these recommendations
20. Dobbie v. Pacific & Elec. Co., 95 Cal. App. 781, 273 Pac. 630 (1928); Stevens v.

United States Gas & Elec. Co., 73 N.H. 159, 60 Ad. 848 (1905).
21. Simone v. Kirk, 173 N.Y. 7, 65 N.E. 739 (1902); White v. Consol. Freight Lines,
192 Wash. 146, 73 P.2d 358 (1937).
22. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
dissenting).
23. See 199 N.E.2d at 796-97 (Schaefer, J.,
24. See notes 15 & 17 supra and accompanying text.
25. See note 14 supra. The Illinois court relied heavily on the Restatement since
the substantive law of Florida, situs of the occurrence, was controlling, and the
Florida Supreme Court has stated that it will adhere to the Restatement of Torts.
199 N.E.2d at 774.
26. 199 N.E.2d at 780.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
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could have led to cancellation of the general contractor's policy.2
Significantly, the evidentiary value of such facts lies mainly in their
tendency to show that the general contractor relied upon the insurer's
inspections. If, as the majority stated, such reliance was not necessary
for the insurer's liability, one might well ask why emphasis was
placed upon these particular facts. Having found a duty of care
owed by the insurer to the plaintiffs, the court then found that there
was adequate evidence to uphold the jury verdict that the insurer
had breached this duty,30 and that this breach was a proximate cause
of the plaintiffs' injuries. 31 Justice Schaefer, dissenting, disagreed as
to the holdings of the insurer inspection cases cited in the majority
opinion. He felt that the duty to inspect with care should be placed
on the insurer only when the insurer has taken over inspection duties,
or when
there has been reliance upon the insurer's voluntary inspec32
tions.
It is submitted that, although the instant case may have been
well decided on its particular facts, the majority's statement that
reliance upon the insurer's inspections was not essential for the plaintiffs' recovery will tend to confuse this area of the law. For the
following reasons, it is urged that reasonable reliance upon a compensation insurer's voluntary inspections is essential for recovery in
a negligence action against the insurer-not direct reliance by the
plaintiff, but what may be called "derivative reliance;" that is, reliance
by the employer or other person on whom the primary duty of inspection rests, and through him, by the plaintiff.
First, it is axiomatic that tort liability for negligence is based upon
the breach of a recognized legal duty owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff-most often stated as the duty to exercise reasonable
care under the circumstances.3 This duty is required of the voluntary
actor just as surely as performance is required of the person under a
contractual obligation.4 The determinative issue in the Nelson case
is, of course, whether the insurer's duty to exercise reasonable care
necessarily included the duty to make complete inspections ordinarily
required of the general contractor who owned and operated the hoist.
Foreseeability of risk is perhaps the most important element in de29. Id. at 777-78.

30. Id. at 784.
31. Ibid.
32. Id. at 797 (dissenting opinion).
33. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
See generally Green, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 34 CoLmv. L. REv. 41 (1934);
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 CoLum. L. REv. 1014 (1928);
Prosser, PalsgrafRevisited, 52 MicH. L. REv. 1, 12-16 (1953).
34. See note 8 supra.
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termining when a duty arises. 35 Indeed, the court recognized that the
insurer's duty to inspect with care arose only as "to such persons as
defendant could reasonably have foreseen would be endangered as
the result of negligent performance." 36 It is contended that this
statement sharply conflicts with the same court's statement that
reliance upon the insurer's inspections was not essential for the
plaintiff's recovery. If there had been no reasonable reliance upon
the insurer's inspections by the general contractor (and through it,
by the plaintiffs), it is difficult to understand why the insurer should
reasonably have foreseen that its failure to inspect the hoist fully
would have endangered the plaintiffs, since the primary duty to
inspect the hoist would have remained with, and presumably have
been fulfilled by, the general contractor. Thus, it is equally difficult to
understand why a duty to inspect with care should be imposed upon
the insurer in such a situation.
Second, in cases that have imposed liability for misfeasance of
voluntary undertakings, there was almost invariably a direct and
immediate relationship between the voluntary actor and the injured
party, by which the injured party's reliance was an obvious and
uncontroverted fact. The comment following section 323 of the
Restatement, dealing with misfeasance of the voluntary actor, states
that the situation to which section 323 is most applicable is where
the actor voluntarily takes a friend for an automobile ride. 37 In such
a case, the passenger's reliance upon the driver is undoubted. This is
not the situation in the instant case, where the primary duty to
inspect the defective hoist, and thus the injured parties' primary
reliance, was on a third party, the general contractor, as long as the
contractor did not reasonably rely upon the insurer to perform its
inspection duties.
Third, the majority's conclusion in the Nelson case that, under the
Restatement view, 38 reliance upon a voluntary undertaking is not
essential for liability for misfeasance of such undertaking leads to some
strange results when read in the light of section 32539 of the Restatement, which expressly requires reliance for recovery for the nonfeasance of a voluntary undertaking. Adherence to the Illinois
Supreme Court's rule dictates that, even though the general contractor
in the instant case had never deviated from its own inspection duties
35. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., supra note 33. "The Restatement of Torts . . .
accepted the view of the Palsgraf Case, that there is no duty, and hence no negligence,
and so never any liability to the unforeseeable plaintiff." Pnosssn, op. cit. supra note 8, §
50, at 294. But see Pnossm,, supra note 33, at 16-19.
36. 199 N.E.2d at 779.
37. RESTATEmEmNT, TORTS § 323(a) (1934).

38. See note 14 supra.
39. Ibid.
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in reliance upon the insurer's inspections, the insurer can be held
fully liable for injuries caused by defects in the hoist if it made only
cursory inspections of the hoist, but it would not be liable had it
overlooked the hoist altogether in the course of its safety inspections.
To avoid this anomaly, it is urged again that the duty of care owed
by a voluntary actor is subject to the condition that his voluntary acts
were reasonably relied upon. With this important condition in mind,
it is submitted that for alleged negligent performance of a voluntary
undertaking (to which section 323 applies) there should be imposed
a rebuttable presumption that the voluntary undertaking was relied
upon by the injured party, thus placing the burden of proving that
there was no reliance upon the voluntary actor. Conversely, when
complete failure to perform a voluntary undertaking is alleged (to
which section 325 applies), the presumption should be that there
was no reliance upon the undertaking, thus placing the burden of
proving that there was reliance on the injured party. Under both
sections, however, it is contended that reasonable reliance upon the
voluntary acts, whether direct or derivative, should be essential for
recovery. It should be noted that cases may arise involving some
special relationship between the parties, as possibly in the case of
repairs by landlords in landlord-tenant cases, 40 in which public policy
factors dictate that the presumption of reliance under section 323
should be conclusive. Nevertheless, it is urged that the above construction of the Restatement presents guidelines which can aid courts
in attaining fair and just results in the great majority of negligence
cases involving voluntary actors, particularly in those involving insurers which have undertaken voluntary inspections.
Fourth, there is a compelling public policy argument against the
"all or nothing rule"41 announced in the instant case. It is contended
that such a rule will hinder the main object and legislative policy
behind workmen's compensation acts. These acts were passed primarily to protect the employee from the hazards incident to his
occupation.4 The pooling nature of insurance has enabled compensation insurance companies, which are intimately connected with the
carrying out of workmen's compensation acts, to make available
to employers expert safety engineering service, including supplementary safety inspections. 43 The great effectiveness of such voluntary
safety service is manifest.44 Thus, through compensation insurance
40. See note 13 supra.
41. See 199 N.E.2d at 797 (Schaefer, J.,dissenting).
42. 8 APPLEMAN, INStEANCE § 4624 (1962).

43. See Hemry, Workmenes Compensation and the Insurance Carrier,370 INs. L.J.
752 (1953).
44. "The accident rate in American industries has been reduced to one third of the
rate 25 years ago, and the severity rate has been reduced nearly as much. While
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companies, the net effect of workInen's compensation acts has been
not only to compensate for injuries, but to avoid them. It seems
clear that any supplementary inspections, whether extensive or merely
cursory, can only benefit employees. It seems equally clear that the
high standard of care demanded by the Illinois Supreme Court for
voluntary, supplementary inspections, regardless of whether there is
any reliance upon them, will discourage insurers from making such
inspections. Thus, on the final ground that the employee is better off
when injuries are avoided than when receiving benefits for them, it
is contended that the "all or nothing rule" should not be followed.

Torts-Negligence-Imputed

Contributory Negligence

Plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile solely owned and operated
by her husband, was injured when that automobile collided with one
operated by the defendant. At the time of the accident, plaintiff and
her husband were en route to his place of employment; it was their
intention, upon arriving there, for her to drive the car to her own place
of employment. At trial evidence was produced from which a jury
could have found either or both of the drivers negligent. The trial judge
held, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff and her husband were
engaged in a "joint enterprise," and he charged the jury that if they
found plaintiff's husband to be guilty of contributory negligence, then
the husband's contributory negligence should be imputed to plaintiff
to bar her recovery. On appeal, held, reversed. The relationship between plaintiff and her husband was not one of "joint enterprise,"
and, moreover, the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence should
be abolished in all instances where there is not a business relationship
between the passenger and the driver of a motor vehicle. Clemens v.
O'Brien, 85 N.J. Super. 404,204 A.2d 895 (1964).
The imputation of a driver's contributory negligence to his passenger rests on the agency principle of respondeat superior: it is
reasoned that since a master is liable to third parties for the negligence
of his servants, a servants contributory negligence should be imputed
to the master in an action by the master against a third party. Further,
since vicarious liability exists between joint adventurers and partners,
the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence has been extended to
many factors have combined to bring about this improvement in safety in American
industry, insurance carriers have made a very substantial contribution." Ibid.

1965 ]

RECENT CASES

1623

the joint adventure and partnership relationships.' Thus whether a
passenger will be held contributorily negligent depends upon the
actual relationship between the driver and the passenger, and upon
whether the particular court views that relationship as an agency
relationship. In the ordinary commercial relationships of masterservant, employer-employee, joint adventurers, and partners, the courts
have been almost unanimous in upholding the doctrine of imputed
contributory negligence. 2 However, there has not been uniformity
in the treatment of those cases in which the relationship between

driver and passenger is purely social, such as that between husband
and wife, or between friends going to an athletic event. A number of
courts have held that whenever the passenger-plaintiff is the owner or
co-owner of the vehicle there is a rebuttable presumption that the passenger has such a right to control the actions of the driver as to make
the driver his servant, thus warranting the imputation of contributory
negligence (hereafter referred to as the passenger-owner rule).3 In
several comparatively recent cases, however, the imputation of contributory negligence has been denied on the ground that in reality the

passenger-owner has no actual control over the vehicle and therefore

the relationship is one of bailor-bailee rather than master-servant. 4 An-

other doctrine often used to effect the imputation of contributory
negligence in cases involving social relationships is the so-called
Cjoint enterprise" rule. Courts employing this doctrine have drawn
an analogy to the mutual agency and liability which exists among

persons temporarily combined for conducting a specific enterprise for
profit, i.e., a joint adventure, and have held that whenever the driver
1. See 2 HAmPER & JAmEs, ToRTs, §§ 23.1-23.8 (1956); PRossER, TORTS §§ 68-73
(3d ed. 1964); Lessler, The Proposed Discard of the Doctrine of Imputed Contributory
Negligence, 20 FOEDHAM L. REv. 156 (1951); Weintraub, The Joint Enterprise
Doctrine in Automobile Law, 16 CoRNELL L.Q. 320 (1930). The forerunner of the
modem doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is the English case of Thorogood v.
Bryan, 8 C.B. 115, 137 Eng. Rep. 452 (1849). In that case, which was a suit by
the representative of a passenger in an omnibus against a negligent third party, it
was held for the first time that a passenger was so identified with the driver of the
omnibus that the latter's contributory negligence would bar recovery. It has become
thoroughly settled in both England and the United States that a passenger in a
common carrier can recover against a negligent third party in spite of the concurring
negligence of the driver. The doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is, however,
a partial revival of the Thorogood case. Weintraub, supra at 321-22.
2. Lessler, supra note 1, at 168; BsTATmvEN, ToRTs § 486 (1934).
3. Ross v. Burgan, 163 Ohio St. 211, 126 N.E.2d 592 (1955).
4. "[W]hat control or right of control has a passenger, even though he may be
[an owner of the vehicle], as the car speeds down the highway... . Any attempted
exercise of the right of control by wresting the wheel from the driver would be
foolhardy. . . . The plain fact of the matter is that there is no 'right of control' in
the passenger, and it is pure legal fiction to assert that such exists simply because (the
passenger has legal title to the car)." Sherman v. Korff, 353 Mich. 387, 395, 91 N.W.2d
485, 486-87 (1958).
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and passenger have a common purpose at the time of the accident
and an equal right to control the vehicle, each is charged with the
negligence of the other.5 In applying this doctrine courts have found
a common purpose in such activities as a husband and wife driving to
an immigration office to secure permission for relatives to enter the
United States, 6 but have denied a common purpose because the driver
and passenger had different destinations. In recent years several
courts have limited the joint enterprise doctrine to situations where
there is a common commercial purpose between the driver and the
passenger. 8 It should be noted that under the passenger-owner rule
and the joint enterprise doctrine the driver's contributory negligence
is imputed to the passenger although the passenger would not be
held liable to the third party for the driver's negligence (e.g., where
husband-owner is being driven by his wife on a purely social mission).
In recognition of this type of situation the Restatement of Torts
requires that the driver's contributory negligence not be imputed to
the passenger unless the passenger would be liable to the third party
for the driver's negligence. This is the so-called "both-ways" test'
and has been widely adopted. 10 It has also been suggested that the
doctrine of imputed contributory negligence be abandoned altogether
and that a passenger be held contributorily negligent only if he was
actually negligent, i.e., the passenger could have prevented the accident but negligently failed to do so."
5. Yanco v. Thon, 108 N.J.L. 235, 157 AUt. 101 (1931). It should be noted that
many courts tend to de-emphasize the "right to control" requirement.
6. Fisch v. Waters, 136 N.J.L. 651, 57 A.2d 471 (1948).
7. Buss v. Robison, 255 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
8. Edlebeck v. Hooten, 20 Wis. 2d 83, 121 N.W.2d 240 (1963). The original
RiESTATEmT OF TORTS seemed to favor this view, see § 491, comment a; and the
proposed RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) definitely adheres to the requirement of common
financial interest. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 491, comment c at 58 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1963).
9. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 485 (1934): The proposed Restatement has abandoned
the "both ways" test and restricted the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence to
the master-servant, § 486, and the joint enterprise (§ 491, common pecuniary interest
between driver and passenger required) relationships. It is stated that this change
was made "because imputed contributory negligence has been very much cut down,
and has now disappeared from a good many areas." RESTATEM NT (SEcoND), TORTS
§ 485, note to institute at 51 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
10. 2 HARPER & JAms, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1273.
11. Jenks v. Veeder Construction Co., 177 Misc. 240, 30 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
"The rule to be desired is that each person be held responsible for his own negligence;
and such personal negligence alone should determine -whether the injured person is
entitled to recover damages. The relationship or status of the driver of a car should
be considered merely as one of the circumstances in determining the personal contributory negligence, if any, of a passenger. No negligence of a driver should be
imputed to a passenger in an action by the latter against a third party solely because
of the status or relationship between the two. The right of a third party to bar a
recovery by such a passenger should depend solely upon the conduct of the passenger
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The defendant in the instant case asserted that the driver and
the plaintiff were engaged in a joint enterprise; therefore, the driver's
contributory negligence should be imputed to the plaintiff. The
appellate court held, however, that the public policy of New Jersey
is to broaden the social burden of accident-caused loss, and that the
merits of the joint enterprise doctrine do not justify frustrating that
policy by charging innocent social passengers12 with responsibility
for their driver's negligence. In so holding, the court pointed out
that while the basis of the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence
is an alleged "mutual agency" between driver and passenger, the
fact that a third party cannot bring an action against a social passenger on the grounds of agency proves that no true agency exists
between drivers and social passengers. 13 The court also pointed out
that the "right to control" requirement of the joint enterprise rule is
irrelevant since a driver is not an agent of a social passenger, and
therefore the passenger should not be held contributorily negligent
unless he breached his duty to control the driver.' 4 Finally, the court
noted that the legal concept of a true joint adventurer is a spurious
basis for the "mutual agency" generally theorized to support the
joint enterprise rule in social-relationship automobile accident cases
because a joint adventurer is, by definition, an association for commercial, not social, purposes. 5 The court also refused to impute the
driver's contributory negligence to the plaintiff on the alternative
ground that a traditional joint enterprise did not exist because the
plaintiff's and the driver's separate destinations militated against a
"common purpose," and because there was no evidence that the
plaintiff had a right to control the movement of the automobile. 16
It is generally accepted in American tort law that responsibility
should be based on personal fault; therefore, since the doctrine of
imputed contributory negligence denies a faultless passenger recovery from a negligent third party, it is submitted that the doctrine
in the actual control of the car or his failure to exercise that control or take such
other action as was reasonably required and warranted by the circumstances. In other
words, the question of the passenger's right to recover should be made dependent
upon the presence or absence of his own personal contributory negligence." Lessler,
supra note 1, at 175.
12. The court expressly withholds decision on the imputation of negligence in situations wherein the driver and passenger stand at the time of the accident in the actual
relationship of employer-employee, or where they are business partners or co-joint
adventurers, Clemens v. O'Brien, 85 N.J. Super. 404, 412, 204 A.2d 895, 899 (1964).
By "social passenger" it is meant the situation wherein there is no commercial relationship between the driver and passenger.
13. Id. at 412-413, 204 A.2d at 899-900.
14. Id. at 413, 204 A.2d at 900.
15. ibid.
16. Id. at 411, 204 A.2d at 899.
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should be carefully analyzed to determine whether it is justified by
public policy.' 7 As noted above, imputed contributory negligence is
founded upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. While the respondeat superior doctrine can be justified as a proper shifting of
the risk of conducting a business with servants to the more financially
responsible, although personally faultless, master, it does not follow
that public policy also justifies the imputation of a servants contributory negligence to the master to bar the master's recovery from
a third party torifeasor. There is no more reason for denying a
master-passenger recovery for his personal injuries than there is for
denying a regular passenger such recovery. 18 The public policy of
allowing an innocent third party to recover against a master for
the torts of his servants simply does not justify exonerating the third
party from responsibility for his own negligence. This is equally
true in the partnership and joint adventure relationships. The third
party cannot be heard to complain since the fact that the passenger
happened to be a master, partner, or joint adventurer is purely
fortuitous. Abolishing the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is also in line with the realities of insurance law since drivers
are usually fully covered for liability to third parties, but passengers
often are not covered for their own personal injuries. 19 Further, the
whole policy of respondeat superior is to broaden the base of liability
for accident-caused injury,2° but the doctrine of imputed contributory
negligence contracts rather than expands that base. But even if the
doctrine of imputed contributory negligence is recognized, it should
be, as it was in the instant case, limited to instances where there is a
commercial relationship between the driver and his passenger. The
public policy underlying respondeat superior, the basis of the doctrine
of imputed contributory negligence, is the placing of the risks of
conducting business on the more financially responsible business
itself.2 1 But when two persons are driving to the supermarket there
17. It should be noted that some writers have proposed that the concept of liability
based on fault be abandoned. BATY, VIcAmous Lmmrry (1916); GRmN, ThArr.c
Vicanvms: TORT LAW AND INSURANcE (1958).
18. "Courts seem unaware that the policies involved in granting or denying the
defensive plea may be different from those controlling the responsibility in damages of
a master for the conduct of his servant, and that the latter are probably concerned
simply with providing a financially responsible defendant." Gregory, Vicarious Responsibility and Contributory Negligence, 41 YALE L.J. 831, 833 (1932).
19. Nearly all states have financial responsibility laws which make liability insurance
compulsory, but no such laws require the carrying of personal insurance. 11 DE PAUL

L. REv. 125, 126 (1962).

20. See Douglas, Vicarios Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 584
(1929); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916); Morris,
The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REv. 339 (1934).
21. See Douglas, supra note 20, at 585-88, 592-94; Morris, supra note 20, at 341.
It should be noted that other theories have been used to justify the doctrine of
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surely is no "business" being conducted, and therefore the public
policy of respondeat superior cannot properly be used as a basis for
depriving the passenger of his right to recover from a negligent third
party. Even assuming, however, that imputed contributory negligence
in social relationships can be justified, the current standards for
determining when to impute contributory negligence should be reexamined. Under the joint enterprise rule in those courts which do
not require a common commercial purpose, for example, contributory
negligence would be imputed if a husband and wife are both going
to the supermarket, but not if the husband was driving his wife to the
supermarket on his way to a ball game; it is difficult to understand
why a distinction should be made between these two situations.
Further, under the passenger-owner rule it is reasoned that the driver
is the agent of the owner since the owner has the "right to contror'
the driver. But, since accidents usually occur so quickly that the
passenger-owner has no opportunity to exercise his "right to control,"
the existence of a "right to control" is a tenuous ground for imputing
contributory negligence.
respondeat superior. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7 H.
L. Rnv. 315, 383, 441 (1894).
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